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ON THE MEANING OF "CONSUMED IN USE" IN THE PROBLEM OF USURY

HERBERT JOHNSTON

In discussions of the morality of usury—several of which discussions are referred to in the footnotes of this paper—differences of opinion exist about the meaning of the expression "consumed in use" as applied to money and about its relative importance for the problem of usury. Since this, in the view of many students of the question, is the central point on which the whole argument turns, an investigation of the meaning of the expression may serve a useful purpose. This essay is offered, not as a dogmatic pronouncement, but as a presentation of its author's present view on a somewhat complex problem and as an invitation to further discussion.

St. Thomas Aquinas was the first medieval moralist to base his treatment of usury directly and explicitly on the notion that money is consumed in use.¹ Behind this notion lies the further one of the

DR. HERBERT JOHNSTON is associate professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He received his A.B. degree from the University of Toronto (St. Michael's College), and his M.A. and Ph.D. from the same University (the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies). He has previously written for THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN.

¹Robert Courson's consideration of usury, like that of St. Thomas, is based on Roman law, but neither explicitly nor implicitly does it appeal to the conception of money as consumed in use. His main argument is that usury is unjust because ownership of the money lent is transferred to the borrower and hence the lender should not seek a return from something not his own. But the reason that Robert gives why ownership is transferred in a loan is not that money is consumed in use, but that the word *mutuum* implies such transfer: "Dicitur enim mutuum quia de meo fit

nature and purpose of money as a measure of price and a medium of exchange. One of the relations with which commutative justice is concerned, St. Thomas points out, is that set up by the transfer of things in exchanges.² When different kinds of things are to be exchanged, such as articles made by one artisan for those made by another, there arises the problem of making these objects commensurate so that justice may be observed in the exchange.³ It will be necessary, for example, for a physician and a farmer, or a contractor and a shoemaker, to have some means of establishing a proportion between their products, for there would be difficulty in deciding how many eggs the physician should get, and a house is obviously worth more than a pair of shoes.⁴ For exchange to take place, all these goods and services must be adequated or made comparable so that their relative values may be established. It was to serve this purpose that money was invented. Money, then, is a measure of the price of exchangeable goods and hence a medium of exchange.⁵ It follows that the principal use

tuum vel e converso." Robert is basing his position on passages in Justinian (*Dig.* xii. 1. f. 2; *Inst.* iii. 14, preface), but makes no mention of the classes of things, listed just before these passages, which are the subject of loan and whose ownership is transferred in a loan. Either he is simply repeating the etymological error (*mutuum* is derived from *muto*, *mutare*: "to change," "exchange") that he found in Justinian, or he is using Justinian as a legal authority. In neither case can it be said that Robert Courson's position on usury is founded either explicitly or implicitly on the notion of money as consumed in use. See G. Lefèvre, "Le Traité 'De Usura' de Robert de Courçon," *Travaux et Mémoires de l'Université de Lille*, x (1902), 15. For the place of this treatise in Robert's *Summa*, see V. L. Kennedy, C.S.B., "The Content of Courson's *Summa*," *Mediaeval Studies*, ix (1947), 81-107. For the spelling of Robert Courson's name, see V. L. Kennedy, C.S.B., "Robert Courson on Penance," *Mediaeval Studies*, vii (1945), 291, n.2.

St. Albert the Great approaches the position that St. Thomas was to take, and may be said to imply it, but does not state it explicitly. His argument is the same as that of Robert Courson, that usury is unjust because ownership of the money lent is transferred in a loan, the very name of which implies such transfer: "Dicitur autem *mutuum*, quasi de meo factum tuum." Unlike Robert, however, St. Albert paraphrases Justinian further and enumerates the classes of things, of which money is one, which can enter into a loan because their ownership is transferred. Since these are precisely things which are consumed in use, it can be said that St. Albert's treatment of usury is founded implicitly but not explicitly on the notion that money is consumed in use. See *Commentarium in Evangelium Lucae*, vi, 35 (*Opera Omnia*, ed. Borgnet [Paris: Vives, 1890-99] xxii, 436a).

²In *V Ethicorum*, lect. 4; ed. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1949), no. 928.

³*Ibid.*, lect. 7; no. 962.

⁴*Ibid.*, lect. 8; nos. 975-77.

⁵"... ad hoc, quod opera diversorum artificum adaequantur, et sic commutari possint, oportet, quod omnia illa quorum potest esse commutatio, sint aequaliter adinvicem comparabilia, ut scilicet sciatur quid eorum plus

of money is to be spent in exchanges. And in that spending of the money in exchange, the substance of the money exchanged is, as it were, consumed, for it is lost to, or alienated from, the one spending it.

The principal use of money is exchange, since it is for this reason that money was instituted. . . . But exchange is a use which, as it were, consumes the substance of the thing exchanged, in that it takes it away from whoever exchanges it.⁶

In developing his condemnation of usury from this point, St. Thomas makes a distinction between things which are consumed in use and things which are not consumed in use; and he shows that the use of things consumed in use and the consumption of the substance of them are identical. The proper use of wine, for example, is to be drunk and the proper use of bread is to be eaten; and such a use involves the consumption of the wine and the bread.⁷ It follows that the use of these things cannot be separated and treated separately from the things themselves. To sell their use, then, apart from the things themselves, is to sell what does not exist or to sell the same thing twice. And since money is consumed in use when it is spent in exchanges, to sell the use of money, or to take usury, is contrary to natural justice.⁸

This is the central point in the Thomistic teaching on usury. The condemnation of the sale of the use of money is based on a conception of the nature of money as primarily a measure of price and a medium of exchange which is consumed in its ordinary use by being spent. The consumption is not, as it is with such things as wine and bread, the destruction of a physical substance, but rather consumption in the sense of alienation of the medium of exchange from the purchaser. Once he spends a certain sum of money, a certain claim on goods and services, the borrower cannot possibly recover that identical money, that identical claim, in order to return it to the lender. And he cannot use it—that is, spend it—without so alienating or consuming it. Since the physical nature of the money used is not in question (it may be, indifferently, hides, metal, paper, bank balances, or anything agreed

valeat et quid minus. Et ad hoc inventa est moneta, idest denarius, per quam mensurantur pretia talium rerum. Et sic denarius fit quoddam medium, in quantum scilicet omnia mensurat, et superabundantiam scilicet et defectum, in quantum una res superexcedit aliam . . ." (*ibid.*, lect. 9; no. 979). For St. Thomas's explanation of money as a store of value, see *ibid.*, no. 986.

⁶"Pecuniae autem . . . principalis usus est commutatio; propter hanc enim pecunia facta est. . . . Commutatio autem est usus quasi consumens substantiam rei commutatae, in quantum facit eam abesse ab eo qui commutat" (*De Malo*, XIII, a. 4 ad 15). Cf. *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 78, a. 1.

⁷*De Malo*, XIII, a. 4.

⁸*Ibid.* Cf. *ST*, II-II, q. 78, a. 1 ad 5.

upon), the substance of money considered as medium of exchange is really consumed or used up when the purchaser spends it.

The argument outlined above is the primary one leading to the Thomistic condemnation of usury. A second argument, also founded on the conception of money as consumed in use and hence as inseparable from its use, is that usury is unjust because ownership of the money lent is transferred to the borrower in a loan. Since the use and consumption of a thing consumed in use are identical—since, that is, to use it is to use it up—it follows that if the use of such a thing is granted to anyone in a loan, the thing itself must be granted to him.⁹ And since money falls within this class, its ownership must be transferred to the borrower when it is lent; and to exact a return for its use is to take something for the use of what belongs to another. This is clearly unjust.¹⁰

St. Thomas's position is, briefly, this: Money is a measure of price and therefore a medium of exchange; as a medium of exchange its normal use is to be spent; in being spent it is lost to the buyer or used up, is consumed in use; the use of money, then, cannot be separated from the money itself. From this point St. Thomas develops two arguments against usury, one that it is unjust to make a separate charge for the use of money over and above the money itself; the other that, as ownership must be transferred in a loan, it is unjust to charge the borrower for the use of what he owns. It is to be noted that both of these conclusions are reached from the premise that money is consumed in use. The use of money is inseparable from the money itself; hence, first, the lender may not charge separately for its use, and, secondly, ownership of money loaned is transferred to the borrower—because, and only because, money is consumed in use.

A schema may make this argument somewhat easier to follow.

It is difficult to exchange goods by barter;



these goods can be reduced to a common denominator by money;

therefore



money is a measure of price; therefore



money is a medium of exchange; therefore



money is spent or consumed in use; therefore

⁹ST, II-II, q. 78, a. 1. Cf. *ibid.*, a. 2 ad 5.

¹⁰In III Sententiarum, d. 37, q. 1, a. 6.

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money is inseparable from its use; therefore

↓
[first conclusion] it is unjust to make a separate charge for the use of money.

↓
if the use of money is granted to anyone, the money must be granted to him, or, ownership of money lent is transferred in a loan; therefore

↓
[second conclusion] it is unjust to charge for the use of money that the borrower now owns.

In basing his arguments against usury on the notion that money is one of those things which are consumed in use, and in showing why this is so, St. Thomas is following Roman law. In various passages in Justinian it is explained that a loan (*mutuum*) occurs in connection with those things which are weighed, measured, or numbered, such as wine, oil, grain, or coined money. These become the property of the borrower, who returns to the lender, not the identical things loaned, but other things of the same nature and quality.¹¹ There is also in Justinian an explanation of why such things are the subject of loan. In a passage from which St. Thomas quotes directly,¹² it is explained that usufruct, "the right of using and enjoying another's goods while keeping intact the substance of those goods," does not apply to those things which are consumed in use, such as wine, oil, grain, and clothing. "And coined money is closely related to these things, for in its very use it is, in a way, destroyed by constant exchange."¹³

¹¹"... mutui autem obligatio in his rebus consistit, quae pondere numero mensurave constant, veluti vino oleo frumento pecunia numerata aere argento auro. Quae res aut numerando aut metiendo aut pendendo in hoc damus, ut accipientium fiant et quandoque nobis non eadem res, sed aliae eiusdem naturae et qualitatis reddantur" (*Inst.* iii. 14, preface). Cf. *Dig.* xlv. 7. f. 1; xii. 1. f. 2).

¹²*ST*, II-II, q. 78, a. 1 ad 3.

¹³"*Usus fructus est ius alienis rebus utendi fruendi salva rerum substantia. . . . Constituitur autem usus fructus non tantum in fundo et aedibus, verum etiam in servis et iumentis ceterisque rebus exceptis his quae ipso usu consumuntur: nam eae neque naturali ratione neque civili recipiunt usum fructum. Quo numero sunt vinum oleum frumentum vestimenta. Quibus proxima est pecunia numerata: namque in ipso usu adsidua permutatione quodammodo extinguitur*" (*Inst.* ii. 4, preface and n. 2). Cf. *Dig.* vii. 5, f. 2.

Why clothing should be included in this list of things consumed in use remains, for this writer, a puzzle, since clothing, unlike the other examples given, is not immediately consumed in its proper use, but can, like a house or a field, be used and returned identically to its owner. This example of clothing does not occur in the other passages in Justinian referring to

These texts from the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* have been analyzed and explained by many modern commentators. One of these commentators, in particular, provides so clear an explanation of the contract of *mutuum* in Roman law and of the meaning of the later term "fungible" that it seems advisable to quote from him at some length. He says:

The *mutuum* was a loan, most commonly a loan of money. The obligation took its rise from the delivery of the money, its passage from the hands of the lender into those of the borrower. It not only passed into the hands of the borrower; it became his property. Such was the Roman theory of the transaction. There was a transfer of ownership from one party to the other. Without this it seemed to the Romans impossible for the receiver to make use of what he received. If the lender retained his ownership in the money, he was entitled to demand again that very money, the same identical pieces of gold or silver that he had advanced. But with such a requirement the loan would be practically worthless. The borrower, if he used the pieces, must throw them into the ever-flowing channels of business, where they could never again be identified or recovered. It was necessary, then, according to Roman ideas, that the borrower should become owner of the money; but at the same time and by the same act he came under an obligation; he was bound to return an equivalent amount of money to the lender. Now, there are other things besides money which disappear and are lost with the using. Such are grain, wine, oil, dye-stuffs, and the like. Of all these things the Roman writers say that "they consist in number, weight, and measure." If a man was entitled to ten aurei, and had to take them from a pile of those coins lying before him, it was a matter of perfect indifference what particular ones he took: he thought only of the number: any set of ten would do as well as any other. . . . For this important class of things—in which, if the kind and quality be determined, the individual

things that can enter into a *mutuum*, and may have been included here through an oversight. St. Thomas avoids this example in his discussions of the question, though he uses others found in Justinian.

Another difficulty in this text is the use of the adjective "adsidua" with "permutatione," for it seems to add nothing pertinent to the meaning of the noun. Money is destroyed or consumed by being used in exchange, but why in "constant" exchange remains uncertain. When it is said that money is consumed in use, it is not the physical token such as metal or paper that is referred to, but money as a medium of exchange, which is lost to the buyer as soon as he spends it. St. Thomas avoids this difficulty and makes the meaning much clearer by paraphrasing "in ipso usu adsidua permutatione quodammodo extinguitur" as "usus quasi consumens substantiam rei commutatae, in quantum facit eam abesse ab eo qui commutat." See above n. 6. The Krueger edition gives no variant readings for either "vestimenta" or "adsidua."

substances are no longer of account, but only the amount or quantity—the Romans had no single name; modern writers have called them fungible things (from *fungor*, to discharge an office), because a given amount, a pound, for instance, will do duty for, will perform the part of, any other pound. It was necessary to describe them here, because all fungible things, and only such, could be objects of a *mutuum*. . . . The obligation imposed by this contract was only that of equivalent return.¹⁴

The foregoing exposition sheds considerable light on the relation between the notion designated by the term “consumed in use” and that designated by the later¹⁵ term “fungible.” As another student of the problem, Father Beck, has pointed out, “the two notions are quite distinct. In fact it is the former notion which is essential for the contract of *mutuum*.”¹⁶ Beck also mentions some of the confusions in thought that have arisen from failure to grasp clearly the relation of these terms.¹⁷ Since his article was written, there has ap-

¹⁴James Hadley, *Introduction to Roman Law* (New York: Appleton, 1873), pp. 217-19. Cf. T. P. McLaughlin, C.S.B., “The Teaching of the Canonists on Usury,” *Mediaeval Studies*, 1 (1939), 100-102; W. W. Buckland, *A Manual of Roman Private Law* (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1925), pp. 272-73.

In connection with the text quoted above, Hadley has this to say: “I have said that the usufructuary could make any use of the object which suited his interest or pleasure. The statement requires some qualification. He must put the object to its natural and proper use. . . . And, what is more important, he must not use up the object. . . . This belongs in fact to the Roman law definition of the right: *ususfructus est jus alienis rebus utendi fruendi SALVA RERUM SUBSTANTIA* (the substance of the thing being unimpaired—without injury to its substantial value). It is worthy of remark that, according to the letter of this definition, a good many things are incapable of a usufruct. Thus, all articles of food; they do not admit of the *utendi fruendi salva rerum substantia*. A bushel of wheat or a barrel of apples cannot be used without being used up. Here, use and consumption are the same thing. And this is also true, though it is not quite so obvious, in regard to money. It is among the things which perish in the using. If we use it at all, it must be in buying, lending, giving; and in all these cases we lose it. . . . The Roman jurists, therefore, would not acknowledge a usufruct of money. . . .” (Hadley, *Roman Law*, pp. 192-93).

¹⁵Lord Mackenzie assigns its first use to the sixteenth-century German jurist Zase. See *Studies in Roman Law* (4th ed.; Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1876), p. 266.

¹⁶Andrew Beck, A.A., “Usury and the Theologians,” *Dublin Review*, CDVI (July, 1938), 81.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, footnotes. Father Beck might have added to his list the name of Father Cleary, who so completely mistakes the meaning of “fungible” as to equate it with things which are not consumed in use, such as horses, as opposed to things which are consumed in use, such as meal. (The examples are Father Cleary’s). See Patrick Cleary, *The Church and Usury* (Dublin: Gill, 1914), pp. 80-81. The same error occurs in W. J. Ashley, *An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory*, Part I (3d ed.; New York: Putnam, 1894), sec. 17, p. 152.

peared a scholarly and enlightening treatment of usury problems, Father Dempsey's *Interest and Usury*,¹⁸ which nevertheless contains what appears to be a faulty interpretation of "consumed in use" and the place of this notion in the moral consideration of usury.

Before examining Father Dempsey's position it will be helpful to distinguish, as he himself briefly does, between the loan called *mutuum* and the loan called *commodatum* in Roman law. *Mutuum* occurs, and occurs only, when something consumed in use, such as milk, bread, or money, is granted to another to be put to its ordinary use, a use which involves its consumption and does not allow the identical article to be returned. Because, and only because, the use of this thing involves its consumption, the thing itself is inseparable from its use; and its ownership is necessarily handed over to the borrower when its use is given to him. Each of these points has a consequence. Since ownership is transferred, the borrower holds what he borrows in a loan of *mutuum* at his own risk, regardless of what happens to it, and is bound to restore its equivalent even though it may be lost or destroyed through forces beyond his control. Since the use of this thing involves its consumption, the borrower is bound to restore no more than its equivalent, for the thing and its use may not be separated and charged for separately. To make such a demand would be to charge a borrower for a loaf of bread (the loaf that he returns) and also for his eating it, for a sum of money and also for his spending it.¹⁹ In the absence of any extrinsic title to interest and on the sole basis of the loan of *mutuum*, to charge something for the use of what is immediately consumed in its proper use—for example, to demand more than the principal in a loan of money—is to be guilty of usury.

Commodatum occurs when something not consumed in use²⁰ (such as a house, a horse, or a farm) is granted to another to be put to its

¹⁸Bernard W. Dempsey, S.J., *Interest and Usury* (London: Dobson, 1948).

¹⁹Cf. Etienne Gilson, *Le Thomisme* (5th ed.; Paris: Vrin, 1944), p. 452.

²⁰*Commodatum* may also involve things which are consumed in their ordinary use as long as they are not being put to that use; for example, money loaned to be used for display, not to be spent in exchange. Cf. St. Thomas, *De Malo*, XIII, a. 4 ad 15; *ST*, II-II, q. 78, a. 1 ad 6. In these passages St. Thomas is speaking of the contract of *pignus* (money handed over to a creditor as a pledge of, or security for, payment of a debt) as well as of the contract of *commodatum*; the principle, however, is the same in both, for in either case the money is not to be consumed by being spent in exchange and can be returned identically.

In connection with this point, it is worth noting that Professor Bourke speaks of a gratuitous loan of money as "a loan of accommodation." See Vernon J. Bourke, "Material Possessions and Thomistic Ethics," *Philosophic Thought in France and the United States*, ed. by Marvin Farber ("University of Buffalo Publications in Philosophy," 1950), p. 622; and

ordinary use, a use which does not involve its consumption, but allows the identical article to be returned. Because the use of this thing does not involve its consumption, the thing and its use can be separated; and its ownership need not be handed over to the borrower when its use is given to him.²¹ Each of these points also has a consequence. Since ownership is not transferred, the borrower holds what he borrows in a loan of *commodatum*²² at the lender's risk, is bound to exercise only ordinary care to preserve it, and need not return it (or rather its value) if it is lost or destroyed through forces beyond his control. Since the use of this thing does not involve its consumption, the thing and its use may be separated and charged for separately. If this occurs, the contract of *commodatum*, which is itself gratuitous, becomes one of lease and rent (*locatio* and *conductio*), with the borrower becoming the lessee and the lender the lessor. Such an alteration of the contract does not, as usury does, involve any injustice, for the things in question are not immediately consumed in their proper use and can be returned identically. Because they are not consumed in use they are not, in this case, actually fungibles, and may justly be leased, for after a period of use they are still there to be restored identically to their owner.²³

As this qualification of the term "fungibles" suggests,²⁴ one must ascertain, in every particular loan, the use to which the thing loaned is actually to be put, as well as its general nature and the use to which it is ordinarily put or is capable of being put. We have seen²⁵ that

Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1951), p. 392. If this term means merely a loan made as a personal favor, it is correct, although a possible source of confusion. If it means a loan of *commodatum*—and "loan of accommodation" is the term that Dempsey uses to translate *commodatum* (*Interest and Usury*, p. 141)—it is incorrect, for a loan of *commodatum* applies to a thing that is not consumed in use, that is to be returned identically to the lender, that is not actually a fungible in that transaction (see below, p. 105).

²¹If ownership were to be transferred, the contract would be one of gift (*donatio*).

²²In a loan of *commodatum* a definite time is fixed for the return of the thing borrowed. If no such agreement is made, but the time of return is left to the lender's will, the contract becomes one of *precarium*.

²³Cf. *Inst.* iii. 14. n. 2; McLaughlin, "The Canonists on Usury," pp. 100-101; Hadley, *Roman Law*, pp. 220-21; Dempsey, *Interest and Usury*, pp. 141-42. Dempsey lists *locatio* and *conductio* under contracts by which ownership is transferred, with this qualification, that what is transferred is "ownership as to use (*dominium utile*). Why this refinement of the notion of ownership should put *locatio* and *conductio* in the list of contracts by which ownership is transferred, while leaving *commodatum* in the list of those by which ownership is not transferred, is not made clear.

²⁴Cf. n. 20, last line.

²⁵N. 20.

money, when loaned, is ordinarily but not necessarily involved in a loan of *mutuum*; as long as it is not going to be spent in exchange, it may be the object of a loan of *commodatum*. In this latter case, money is still a medium of exchange which is consumed in its normal use; it is still a fungible good, any unit of which has the power to serve in place of any other. The point is that in this individual transaction this particular money *is not* consumed in use because it is deposited rather than spent; one unit *does not* function in place of another because the money is not consumed in use but is returned identically to its owner. One may have, then, a good which is consumable but *is not consumed* in a particular loan (of *commodatum*), a good which is fungible but *does not function*, one unit in place of another, in the same loan. Hence, to decide whether one is dealing with a loan of *mutuum* or with a loan of *commodatum*, he must know not only what use the goods loaned *can be* put to in general, but what use they *are being* put to in the transaction in question. Let us call "potentially fungible" those goods which may be consumed in use, one unit of which may function for another (Dempsey's apt phrase is "standardized objects") though the particular examples in question may not be destined for such use; for example, money considered in general or money which, in a particular transaction, is not going to be spent. Let us call "actually fungible" the examples of such goods that are actually consumed in use, that do have other units serve for them; for example, money which, in a particular transaction, is going to be spent or has been spent. If a further distinction were necessary, we might call "actually functioning" the examples of such goods that are used to replace other units already consumed in use; for example, money repaid to a lender to terminate a loan of *mutuum*. The application of this point and of this terminology will become more evident in our consideration of Dempsey's work.

In order to follow the rest of this discussion, the reader should have readily available as exact a statement as possible of Father Dempsey's position on the meaning of "consumed in use" and of its place in the problem of usury. For this reason there follows a quotation of considerable length from his work.

In the case of *mutuum*, this question of classification and accurate definition is a cardinal one. Understanding of the Schoolmen's analysis of usury largely depends upon an understanding and an easy, ready application of the distinction between a loan of *mutuum* and a loan of accommodation. Upon this distinction depends the question of ownership at a stated moment of the good being loaned, and upon the ownership

depends the right to the product of that good. . . .

Certain writers have said, in attempted extenuation of usury theorists, that the Schoolmen sought to prohibit interest on consumption loans. But Molina, Lessius, and Lugo are far from willing to make that a central factor. The important characteristics of a *mutuum* are two: (1) that the ownership of the thing loaned passes with the loan, and (2) that payment is to be made not by returning the identical article but one of the same kind. When the important qualities of things are "fixed in number, weight, or measure," there is no purpose in insisting upon the identical object loaned being returned, since such standardized objects readily work, one in place of another. This is obviously true of consumption goods but not exclusively. Two schools, for example, might supplement each other's supply of folding chairs by making gratuitous loans as occasional need for each arose. If the folding chairs in both schools were of the same standard model, there would be no purpose in exercising care to return the same chairs. The loan would be of a standard fungible good but not of a consumption good, and the loan would be a *mutuum*. And, during the loan, the lending school would own no chairs but would have claim on the borrowing school for the number of chairs of the same condition as were borrowed. Our authors also use the example of a goldsmith or silversmith who needs a certain amount of metal to finish a particular piece on which he is working. A neighboring workman with a little excess supply might let him take a few ounces for a few days at no charge, provided the same weight and fineness were returned. The loan would unquestionably be a loan of *mutuum*, though the object of the loan could not be called a consumption good.

Molina does not include the notion of consumption good in his definition of *mutuum*, in which the crucial point is the transfer of ownership, which is practicable because we are dealing with a fungible good. . . .

It would seem that though Molina, with the Roman law, regarded a *mutuum* as practically concerned with consumption goods, nevertheless this is not the point which is, in principle, determining. The critical factor is the transfer of ownership, which is bound up with the fungibility. . . .

Lugo notices the observations of both writers [Lessius and Molina] and raises difficulties about defining what qualities can be said to be fixed in number, weight, and measure. Ultimately he dismisses the matter apparently as not being worth investigating and returns to the fundamental position that it is the transfer of ownership which is decisive. But surely the examples which he gives, that sometimes even building materials might be sufficiently constant in form to become the object of a *mutuum*, amply indicate that, in his opinion, the norm of

"consumption goods" does not go to the heart of the matter, which for him rests entirely in the transfer of ownership.²⁶

But the norm of consumption goods, if this writer understands it correctly, does go to the heart of the matter; and on it depends the transfer of ownership. In Dempsey's example of the folding chairs, we are dealing with a *mutuum* and a fungible good—precisely because we are dealing with a consumption good. These chairs are consumed in the sense of being irrecoverably mixed up with other chairs. To be put to use in the manner agreed upon by both schools, the borrowed chairs must be used up in the sense that the identical chairs loaned cannot be recovered and returned to the lender. In using them, the borrowing school literally loses them among its other chairs. The school must receive ownership of the borrowed chairs as well as the obligation of returning their equivalent in number and quality; otherwise it would have to keep the borrowed chairs separate after obtaining them by a loan of *commodatum* rather than by one of *mutuum*.

²⁶Dempsey, *Interest and Usury*, pp. 142-44. There is an incidental but not unimportant difficulty raised by the sentence, "Certain writers have said, in attempted extenuation of usury theorists, that the Schoolmen sought to prohibit interest on consumption loans." As explicitly supporting this view there comes to mind Hilaire Belloc, "On Usury," *Essays of a Catholic Layman in England* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1931), p. 32. Other writers employ terminology implying adherence to this position. For example, Bourke uses "a business loan" ("Material Possessions and Thomistic Ethics," p. 623); Walter Farrell, O.P., uses "a loan for productive purposes" as contrasted with "a loan for unproductive purposes" (*A Companion to the Summa* [New York: Sheed and Ward, 1945] III, 240); W. A. Orton uses "an unproductive loan" (*The Liberal Tradition* [New Haven: Yale Univ. Press], p. 87). To judge from the context in which his sentence occurs, Father Dempsey is here using "consumption loans" in the sense of loans of "consumption goods"; that is, things consumed in use. He then goes on to explain why, in his opinion, the notion of consumption goods is not the "central factor" in the consideration of *mutuum* and usury. But what "consumption loans" has meant in discussions on usury since the seventeenth century, what the authors cited mean by it, and what Dempsey himself means by it earlier in his work (pp. 3-5) is not the loan of something consumed in use as opposed to something not consumed in use, but the loan of money for the purchase of consumption goods; for example, food, rather than for the purchase of capital goods like machinery. The writers making this distinction hold that to demand a return on a "consumption loan" is unjust because such a loan does not produce new wealth, whereas to demand a return on a "productive loan" is just because such a loan does produce new wealth.

Whichever meaning Father Dempsey intends here, this latter view (condemned by Pope Benedict XIV in his encyclical *Vix Peruenit* of 1745) rests upon an apparent confusion between loan and investment, between *mutuum* and *societas* ("partnership"). In a *mutuum* the lender gives the borrower money to be spent for whatever purpose he sees fit; hence he must transfer ownership of the money to the borrower. If the borrower uses this money

What Dempsey has seen and has aptly pointed out is that fungible things are simply "standardized objects." What he has overlooked, it would appear, is the fact²⁷ that such standardized objects as these folding chairs may be potentially fungible because they are standardized, but that some units *do not* actually function for others (are not actually fungible in this particular transaction) unless those others are previously consumed by alienation through being lost, as recoverable individual units, among all the others. To be actually fungible in this second sense (and it is only this sense of "fungible" that is involved in a loan of *mutuum*), the goods in question must first be consumed, either physically, as with milk or bread, or by alienation from the possessor, as with money or folding chairs. A thing is the object of a

profitably by making actual its virtual productivity, he is using what is now his own and so has a right to any profit. It follows that if the enterprise fails the borrower also suffers the loss and must still repay the amount borrowed. In a *societas* (or its variant, a *commenda*), on the other hand, one partner invests his money in a joint enterprise in which (in its simplest form) another invests his knowledge and labor with or without additional money; hence the first partner does not transfer ownership of the money to the second, but retains ownership of it as his part of the partnership's assets. If the second partner, through his skill and industry, uses this money profitably, he is using what is not his own and so has a right only to that agreed proportion of the profit to which the investment of his labor entitles him, the rest of the profit going to the first partner. It follows that if the enterprise fails, the first partner also suffers his share of the loss and may not claim all or sometimes any of the money which he invested. There is, in short, no such thing as a "production loan" as opposed to a "consumption loan"; the real distinction is that between a loan and an investment. Cf. *Inst.* iii. 25; McLaughlin, "The Canonists on Usury," pp. 102-5; St. Thomas, *ST*, II-II, q. 78, a. 2 ad 5; *In V Ethic.*, lect. 6, no. 949; Frederick E. Flynn, *Wealth and Money in the Economic Philosophy of St. Thomas* (Notre Dame, 1942), pp. 66-67; Cleary, *The Church and Usury*, pp. 157, 161; George O'Brien, *An Essay on Mediaeval Teaching* (London: Longmans, 1920), p. 183; Beck, "Usury and the Theologians," pp. 83-85. Beck, however, agrees with Dempsey on the importance of the transfer of ownership: "What is fundamental to the idea of both *mutuum* and usury is that there is complete surrender of the ownership of the consumptible which is inseparable from its use" (p. 87). For a description of various types of medieval maritime partnership, see C. B. Hoover, "The Sea Loan in Genoa in the Twelfth Century," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XL (1925-26), 495-529.

The foregoing brief account of the difference between *mutuum* and *societas*, if correct, would seem to remove the foundation for a recent charge that in his teaching on partnerships St. Thomas "abandons his own principle that the use and the ownership of money are indistinguishable." See John T. Noonan, Jr., *Banking and the Early Scholastic Analysis of Usury* ("Catholic University of America Philosophical Series," Vol. cxxxiv; micro-card [Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1951]), pp. 178-79.

²⁷See above, p. 101.

loan of *mutuum*, its ownership is transferred, and it is actually fungible *because* it is consumed in the use to which it is being put.

The same is true in the example of the goldsmith. The few ounces of gold which he borrows are consumed by being inextricably mixed with other gold in the article that he is making. He uses the gold in such a way that he cannot recover and return the identical grains borrowed. If he is to put the gold to this use, a use which makes impossible the return of the same gold borrowed, it is necessary for him to become its owner, for he cannot put it to the use which he intends without receiving that effective control over it that constitutes ownership. The situation is the same in a loan of money. If the borrower is to use the money at all (excluding such use as display, in which case there is no question of *mutuum*), he must spend it; if he spends it he cannot recover the identical money borrowed and spent, which is now consumed, lost, irretrievably mingled with other "currency." But to possess this power of disposal over anything is to possess ownership of it.

To use the chairs, the gold, the money in the manner indicated in all these instances is to consume them in just as real a sense, though in a less obvious because not physical sense, as to use bread or wine or oil is to consume them. And in all these instances it is the fact that these goods are to be thus consumed in use that allows them to become objects of a loan of *mutuum*, makes them actually fungibles in the transaction in question, and demands that their ownership be transferred to the borrower. It is consumption in use, not transfer of ownership, that is central in the problem of *mutuum* and usury; the second point depends on the first, and the heart of the matter is the notion of "consumed in use."²⁸

Whether or not the foregoing interpretation of "consumed in use" is correct, it is a fact that many representative Scholastics based their treatment of *mutuum* and usury primarily on this point rather than on that of the transfer of the ownership of money from the borrower to the lender. For this reason it would appear that Dempsey's assertion that Molina, Lessius, and Lugo represent the authentic medieval tradition on this point is open to question, and that to speak of them as "the Schoolmen" or as representing "the Schoolmen" is to claim

²⁸In a later work, Father Dempsey restates his position on this point, though only incidentally to his able and convincing establishment of the existence and nature of institutional usury. See his "The Usury Element in Inflation," *Review of Social Economy*, IX (March, 1951), 38. The considerations outlined above, if correct, would apply to the relevant passages in this article as well.

too much. He says:

The writers whom we shall discuss considered themselves at one with the medieval way of thinking. All three wrote, if not strictly in form, at least very definitely in practical content, a commentary on Thomas Aquinas . . . they did not consider that they brought to this work anything strikingly new. Their work was of a piece with that of Aquinas and Antoninus of Florence . . . absolutely the same principles ruled.²⁹

For Molina, Lessius, and Lugo, as Dempsey has shown, the basic factor in a *mutuum*, and so in the question of usury, is the transfer of ownership; they explicitly reject the notion of "consumed in use" as the important point. As we have already seen at the beginning of this paper, St. Thomas bases his treatment of *mutuum* and usury definitely and explicitly on the notion of money as consumed in use; the argument based on the transfer of ownership depends directly on that conception and is intelligible only in its light. On this question, then, and this is the one at issue, the work of Molina, Lessius, and Lugo can hardly be said to be "of a piece with that of Aquinas."³⁰

It is little, if any, closer to that of St. Antoninus of Florence (1389-1459), though one of the latter's arguments against usury is founded on the transfer of ownership in *mutuum* and another mentions it in passing. The second of these arguments is drawn directly from St. Thomas and contains an explicit citation of his work. St. Antoninus here repeats the Thomistic distinction between things which are consumed in use, such as grain, and things which are not so consumed, such as houses. In order to bring out the manner in which money can be said to be consumed in use, he speaks of money as being dispersed in exchanges. To such things as grain and money he contrasts those which are not consumed or dispersed in use, and continues with the familiar Thomistic development.³¹

St. Antoninus is here arguing, as St. Thomas did, that usury is unjust because to sell the use of money is to sell what does not separately exist. The point of the transfer of ownership plays no essential part

²⁹Dempsey, *Interest and Usury*, pp. 116-18.

³⁰Father Vermeersch also identifies the doctrine of Molina, Lessius, and Lugo with that of St. Thomas. However, instead of treating the doctrine of the former, he reverses the process and gives what appears to be a brief exposition of the Thomistic argument, based on consumption in use. See A. Vermeersch, "Usury," *Catholic Encyclopedia* Vol. XV (1912), 234a. But it can no more be said that Molina, Lessius, and Lugo based their teaching on consumption in use than it can be said that St. Thomas based his on transfer of ownership.

³¹*Summa Theologica*, Pars II, tit. 1, cap. 6 (Verona: 1740); Vol. II, cols. 75D-76C.

in the reasoning, though St. Antoninus does mention it incidentally. But when he mentions it he deduces it as a conclusion from the principle that money is consumed in use:

In things whose use is their consumption or dispersal, the use of such things cannot be computed separately from the things themselves, because it is inseparable; and from the very fact that the use of such things is granted to anyone the thing is also granted; and *for this reason*, in such things ownership is transferred in a loan.³²

This is not the doctrine of Molina, Lessius, and Lugo.

In another passage St. Antoninus quotes the supposed derivation of the word *mutuum* and argues from the legal principle that ownership is transferred in a loan to the conclusion that what is lent is therefore held at the risk of the borrower. From this fact it follows, he continues, that such things properly fall within the class of goods which are consumed or dispersed in use and that therefore no more than the principal need be returned.³³ Here St. Antoninus reverses his previous argument, abandons the philosophical ground on which that argument is founded, and reasons in a purely legalistic manner reminiscent of Robert Courson.³⁴ Since Molina, Lessius, and Lugo are not content to appeal simply to the authority of Roman law, but are at pains to reason out the nature of *mutuum* and usury, they do not appear to have much more in common with St. Antoninus than with St. Thomas.

In the light of the foregoing development, it may fairly be asked whether, by rejecting the notion of "consumed in use" in favor of that of "transfer of ownership" as the fundamental point in the consideration of *mutuum* and usury, Molina, Lessius, Lugo, and Father Dempsey do not seem to have cut themselves off from the authentic medieval tradition on this problem and from the possibility of a true understanding of its solution.

³²"... in rebus . . . quarum . . . usus est ipsarum consumptio vel distractio, non potest computari seorsum usus talium rerum ab ipsis rebus, quia inseparabilis est: et cuicumque conceditur usus talium rerum, ex hoc ipso conceditur et res; et propter hoc in talibus per mutuum transfertur dominium" (*ibid.*, col. 76B).

³³*Ibid.*, cap. 7, col. 86B-C.

³⁴See n. 1.

THE CONCLUSION OF THE *PRIMA VIA*—*Continued*

JOSEPH OWENS, C.Ss.R.

IV

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

SCRIPTUM SUPER LIBROS SENTENTIARUM

In his commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*, St. Thomas presents the arguments that proceed from creatures to God under three heads, independently of any Aristotelian schema. The procedure is threefold: through causality, through removal, and through eminence. The basis of the reasoning in all three cases is that the *esse* of creatures is from something else.⁸²

The first reason, the *via* of causality, is that there must be something from which creatures derive their *esse*, since creatures have *esse ex nihilo*. This latter fact is evident “from their imperfection and potentiality.” The imperfection and potentiality of creatures—the way along which the *prima via* of the *Summa Theologiae* proceeds—are made the basis for the argument from *esse*. The imperfection and potentiality of creatures, accordingly, are seen as manifesting a lack of *esse* and so from this viewpoint lead to some one thing that is primary and which is forthwith seen to be God.⁸³

The second argument, based on “removal,” is that the imperfect presupposes the perfect. But bodies are imperfect, because they are finite and *mobile*. Therefore there is something more perfect than

⁸²“Dicit enim quod ex creaturis tribus modis devenimus in Deum: Scilicet per causalitatem, per remotionem, per eminentiam. Et ratio hujus est, quia esse creaturae est ab altero. Unde secundum hoc ducimur in causam a qua est” (*In I Sent.*, d. 3, divisio 1ae partis textus).

⁸³“Prima ergo ratio sumitur per viam causalitatis, et formatur sic. Omne quod habet esse ex nihilo, oportet quod sit ab aliquo a quo esse suum fluxerit. Sed omnes creaturae habent esse ex nihilo: quod manifestatur ex earum imperfectione et potentialitate. Ergo oportet quod sint ab aliquo uno primo, et hoc est Deus” (*ibid.*).

bodies. But if this incorporeal being is also changeable, it is likewise imperfect. Therefore beyond souls and angels there must be an immobile and all-perfect being, which is God.⁸⁴ The angelic nature is looked upon as a *species mutabilis*. The angels, unlike the Aristotelian separate forms, are considered to be "changeable." This bears particularly upon their operation, since creation and annihilation are not properly *mutatio*.⁸⁵ But the reasoning is brought under the heading that the *esse* of creatures is *ab altero*. Apparently, then, the potentiality and mutability are being conceived in relation to an ultimate act which is *esse*.

Of the three manners of reaching God in the *Sentences*, then, two proceed from the potentiality and mobility of creatures. They attain God respectively as the primary cause of the *esse* of creatures and as the immobile being which is presupposed by all mobile and changeable natures which have their *esse* from another. The operative notion in the procedure from potentiality and mobility to God seems to be that of *esse*.

THE *CONTRA GENTILES*

In the *Contra Gentiles* St. Thomas takes the material from Aristotle but builds up the demonstration along his own lines. He is laying down "the reasons by which Aristotle proceeds to prove that God exists." He finds that the Stagirite "aims to prove this from motion by two *viae*."⁸⁶

The first of these two *viae* seems to result directly in a *first immobile movent*.

⁸⁴"Secunda ratio sumitur per viam remotionis, et est talis. Ultra omne imperfectum oportet esse aliquod perfectum, cui nulla imperfectio admisceatur. Sed corpus est quid imperfectum, quia est terminatum et finitum suis dimensionibus et mobile. Ergo oportet ultra corpora esse aliquid quod non est corpus.

"Item, omne incorporeum mutabile de sui natura est imperfectum. Ergo ultra omnes species mutabiles, sicut sunt animae et angeli, oportet esse aliquod ens incorporeum et immobile et omnino perfectum, et hoc est Deus" (*ibid.*).

Cf. "Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab aliquo est in potentia respectu illius, et hoc quod receptum in eo est est actus eius. Ergo oportet quod ipsa quiditas vel forma que est intelligencia sit in potencia respectu esse quod a Deo recipit, et illud esse receptum est per modum actus" (*De Ente*, cap. 4; ed. Roland-Gosselin [Kain, Belgique: Le Saulchoir, 1926], p. 35, ll. 19-23).

⁸⁵Cf. n. 37 in the first part of this article (THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, xxx [Nov., 1952], 43-44); *De Pot.*, III, a. 2.

⁸⁶"Primo autem ponemus rationes quibus Aristoteles procedit ad probandum Deum esse. Qui hoc probare intendit ex parte motus duabus viis"

Everything that is being moved is being moved by something else. But it is evident through sensation that something is being moved, for instance the sun. Therefore it is being moved by something else moving it. This movent will accordingly either be being moved or not. If it is not being moved, we have therefore what was proposed, that it is necessary to posit an immobile movent. And this we call God. But if it is being moved, it is being moved by something else moving it. The process will therefore either go on indefinitely, or it will arrive at some immobile movent. But it cannot go on indefinitely. Therefore it is necessary to posit a first immobile movent.

But in this proof there are two propositions to be proved; namely, that *everything that is being moved is being moved by another* and that *in movents and things one cannot proceed indefinitely*.⁸⁷

As in the *Summa Theologiae*, the fact from which this reasoning starts—namely, that something is being moved—is accepted as evident. The conclusion, that the first immobile movent is what “we call God,” is likewise treated as needing no proof. Only the two propositions need to be demonstrated.

The first proposition, St. Thomas proceeds, is proved by Aristotle in three ways. The first is the proof from the seventh book of the *Physics*, from the essentially imperfect nature of motion. The second is the argument from induction given in the eighth book of the *Physics*. The third is the demonstration that the movent as such is in act, while the thing being moved is in potency in respect to that act. But nothing can be in act and potency at the same time in the same respect. This third argument is likewise taken from the eighth book of the *Physics*; but there it is used, not as a proof of the first proposition that whatever is being moved is being moved by another, but to show that motion

(CG, I, cap. 13; p. 30a6-9). For a schema of the use made by St. Thomas of the Aristotelian proofs, cf. J. Paulus, “Le caractère métaphysique des preuves thomistes de l’existence de Dieu,” *Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge*, IX (1934), 146.

On the background in Averroes for dividing the Aristotelian arguments into these two *viae*, cf. the critique of Paulus’s article by D. Salman, *Bulletin Thomiste*, IV (1935), 607-8.

⁸⁷“Omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Patet autem sensu aliquid moveri, utputa solem. Ergo alio movente movetur. — Aut ergo illud movens movetur, aut non. Si non movetur, ergo habemus propositum, quod necesse est ponere aliquod movens immobile. Et hoc dicimus Deum. — Si autem movetur, ergo ab alio movente movetur. Aut ergo est procedere in infinitum; aut est devenire ad aliquod movens immobile. Sed non est procedere in infinitum. Ergo necesse est ponere aliquod primum movens immobile.

“In hac autem probatione sunt duae propositiones probandae: scilicet, quod *omne motum movetur ab alio*; et quod *in moventibus et motis non sit procedere in infinitum*” (CG, I, cap. 13; p. 30a10-b8).

must originate in a self-movent and that in the self-movent only a part can be the immobile movent.⁸⁸

The first of these three arguments, as it stands, applies only to divisible—that is, extended—things.⁸⁹ The second is merely an induction. The third alone carries full probative force, and it is the only one retained in the *prima via* of the *Summa Theologiae*.

The second proposition is also established by three arguments. The first is the one taken from the seventh book of the *Physics*, that infinite things cannot be being moved in finite time. The second is the proof from the eighth book of the *Physics*, that motion has to be primarily caused by a first movent, while in an infinite series there is no first. The third is the immediately following argument of the *Physics* which presents the foregoing proof from the viewpoint of the movent and that by which it imparts motion, or, in the terminology of St. Thomas, the principal and the instrumental movents.⁹⁰

The first of these arguments holds only for things that are subject to time; namely, corporeal things. The second and third are unrestricted in their demonstrative scope. For St. Thomas they amount to one and the same proof, which is the one used in the *prima via* of the *Summa Theologiae*.

This first *via* from motion in the *Contra Gentiles*, accordingly, seems to conclude directly to a first immobile movent, which is God. The eternity of the world and the animation of the heavens do not enter into the demonstration at all as it is here developed by St. Thomas. But that these two tenets were presupposed in the original context of the arguments is not forgotten. Their omission, however, only strengthens the proof.⁹¹ The disregard of these two fundamental tenets and the altered order of the arguments shows clearly enough that the proofs have been taken out of their context and been developed

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 31b9-31a57. Cf. Aristotle *Physics* viii. 5. 257b6-13.

⁸⁹*CG*, I, cap. 13; pp. 30b17-31a2.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 31b19-32a7.

⁹¹"Praedictos autem processus duo videntur infirmare. Quorum primum est, quod procedunt ex suppositione aeternitatis motus: quod apud Catholicos supponitur esse falsum.

"Et ad hoc dicendum quod via efficacissima ad probandum Deum esse est ex suppositione aeternitatis mundi, qua posita, minus videtur esse manifestum quod Deus sit. Nam si mundus et motus de novo incoepit, planum est quod oportet poni aliquam causam quae de novo producat mundum et motum: quia omne quod de novo fit, ab aliquo innovatore oportet sumere originem; cum nihil educat se de potentia in actum, vel de non esse in esse.

"Secundum est, quod supponitur in predictis demonstrationibus primum motum, scilicet corpus caeleste, esse motum ex se. Ex quo sequitur ipsum esse animatum. Quod a multis non conceditur.

into an independent demonstration, even though their individual structure is followed as closely as possible.

The arguments of the second *via* from motion in the *Contra Gentiles* are all taken from the eighth book of the *Physics*. The first proposition established is that not every movent is being moved. This is proved by the last of the three arguments used by Aristotle to show that one cannot proceed indefinitely in a series of moved movents. The first conclusion, accordingly, is that there must be a first movent which is not being moved by anything external to itself.

The second step is to show that this has to be either entirely immobile or else self-movent. But if it is self-movent, it is being moved by an immobile part. The Aristotelian arguments to prove this, including the impossibility of a thing's being in act and potency at the same time (already used by St. Thomas in the first *via*), are given in their original order. In a similar way are repeated the arguments that among such self-movents there must be one which is eternal and moved by a part that is immobile both *per se* and *per accidens*. Since God is not a part of a self-movent, Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* proceeds further to the entirely immobile separate movent which is God.⁹²

St. Thomas takes account of the eternity of the world and the animation of the heavens in building up these arguments into his second *via* from motion. But the demonstration is stronger without those tenets. At the basis of the proof from this new viewpoint, the notion of the passage from *non esse* to *esse* is coupled with that of the passage from potency to act.⁹³ Here, as in his commentary on the eighth book of the *Physics* and his other presentations of the argument, the operative notion seems for him to be the reception of *esse* as the act of a potency.⁹⁴

In the *Contra Gentiles*, accordingly, St. Thomas has taken the arguments of the seventh and eighth books of the *Physics* and combined

"Et ad hoc dicendum est quod, si primum movens non ponitur motum ex se, oportet quod moveatur a penitus immobili" (*ibid.*, p. 33b6-27).

⁹²*Ibid.*, pp. 32a12-33b5. Regarding "immobile" at p. 32b19-24, cf. n. 54 in the first part of this article (vol. xxx [Nov., 1952], 47-48).

⁹³"... cum nihil educat se de potentia in actum, vel de non esse in esse" (*ibid.*, p. 33b18-19). The pure act reached by this argument (cf. résumé at end of *CG*, I, cap. 16) is interpreted in the existential sense: "Ostensum est autem in Deo nihil esse de potentia, sed ipsum esse purum actum. Non igitur Dei essentia est aliud quam suum esse" (*CG*, I, cap. 22; p. 68b37-39).

⁹⁴Cf.: "Cum igitur esse sit communis effectus omnium agentium, nam omne agens facit esse actu; oportet quod hunc effectum producant in quantum ordinantur sub primo agente, et agunt in virtute ipsius" (*CG*, III, cap. 66; ed. Leonine, xiv, 188a18-22).

them in the form of two different *viae*. The first of these *viae* proceeds along the lines of the two propositions that "whatever is being moved is being moved by another" and that "one cannot proceed indefinitely in a series of moved movents." Each of the two propositions is proved by three arguments, of which the first in each case is taken from the seventh book and the others from the eighth book. The Aristotelian order is followed, except that the third and vital proof of the first proposition is taken from a later and somewhat different setting. The second *via* proceeds from the proposition that not every movent is being moved and, following the arguments of the eighth book of the *Physics* from where the first *via* ended, arrives first at a self-movement, then at an immobile part of that self-movement, and finally, with the aid of the *Metaphysics*, at an entirely immobile prime movent, which is God.

The first *via* assembles its arguments in such a way as to dispense entirely with the eternity of the world and animation of the heavens. The general structure of this first *via* and the principal proof in each case for its two propositions are retained in the construction of the *prima via* in the *Summa Theologiae*. But in this way the *via* has been completely detached from its Aristotelian basis, the eternity of cosmic motion. It reaches an entirely different conclusion; namely, the unique and creative God of Christian revelation.

THE *DE POTENTIA*

In *De Potentia* the preoccupation in the argument from motion seems clearly to be with *esse*. The later philosophers, St. Thomas states, posited some universal cause from which all other things came into *esse*. This is in accord with the Catholic faith and can be demonstrated by a threefold reason. First, *esse* is found as common to all things and so has to be given them by some one cause. This is considered to be a Platonic reason.⁹⁵ The second reason is taken from Aristotle. There must be a most perfect being because there is an entirely immobile

⁹⁵"Postiores vero philosophi, ut Plato, Aristoteles et eorum sequaces, pervenerunt ad considerationem ipsius esse universalis; et ideo ipsi soli posuerunt aliquam universalem causam rerum, a qua omnia alia in esse prodirent, ut patet per Augustinum. Cui quidem sententiae etiam catholica fides consentit. Et hoc triplici ratione demonstrari potest: quarum prima est haec. . . . Cum ergo esse inveniat omnibus rebus commune, quae secundum illud quod sunt, ad invicem distinctae sunt, oportet quod de necessitate eis non ex se ipsis, sed ab aliqua una causa esse attribuat. Et ista videtur ratio Platonis. . . ." (*De Pot.*, III, a. 5). Cf.: "Sed causa primi gradus est simpliciter universalis; ejus enim effectus proprius est esse" (*In VI Metaphys.*, lect. 3 [Cathala no. 1209]).

and most perfect movent, as the philosophers have proven. Therefore all other things, being less perfect, must receive *esse* from this immobile movent.⁹⁶

The argument from motion is here seen to prove a being from which all other beings receive *esse*. The notions of "being moved" and of "receiving *esse*" seem to coincide, as far as the conclusion of this argument is concerned, in leading to the entirely immobile movent.

The third reason, attributed to Avicenna, reaches a being which is *ipsum suum esse* because it is pure act.⁹⁷ The notion of act, when entirely free from potency, is accordingly the very act of *esse*.

THE COMPENDIUM THEOLOGIAE

In the *Compendium Theologiae*, written after the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa*, the connection of motion with *esse* for St. Thomas in this demonstration is especially clear.

The one argument given to prove directly that God exists is the proof from motion. The primary movent, without further reasoning, is said to be "what we call God."⁹⁸ The immobility reached by the demonstration is such that God *necessarily* exists, for everything that is possible to be and not to be is mutable.⁹⁹ Here the notions of motion and the transition from *non esse* to *esse* are coupled together. The same immobility means that God's *esse* is eternal.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, the pure

⁹⁶"Est autem ponere unum ens, quod est perfectissimum et veracissimum ens: quod ex hoc probatur, quia est aliquid movens omnino immobile et perfectissimum, ut a philosophis est probatum. Oportet ergo quod omnia alia minus perfecta ab ipso esse recipiant. Et haec est probatio Philosophi" (*De Pot.*, III, a. 5).

⁹⁷"Est autem ponere aliquod ens quod est ipsum suum esse: quod ex hoc probatur, quia oportet esse aliquod primum ens quod sit actus purus, in quo nulla sit compositio. Unde oportet quod ab uno illo ente omnia alia sint, quaecumque non sunt suum esse, sed habent esse per modum participationis. Haec est ratio Avicennae" (*ibid.*).

⁹⁸"Videmus enim omnia quae moventur, ab aliis moveri. . . . Hoc autem in infinitum procedere impossibile est. Cum enim omne quod movetur ab aliquo, sit quasi instrumentum quoddam primi moventis, si primum movens non sit, quaecumque movent, instrumenta erunt. . . . Oportet igitur primum movens esse, quod sit omnibus supremum, et hoc dicimus Deum" (*Compend. Theol.*, cap. 3).

⁹⁹"Omne enim quod possibile est esse et non esse, est mutabile: sed Deus est omnino immutabilis, ut ostensum est, ergo Deum non est possibile esse et non esse" (*ibid.*, cap. 6).

¹⁰⁰"Deus autem nullo modo est motui subjectus, ut ostensum est, non igitur est in Deo aliqua successio, sed ejus esse est totum simul. . . . Deo autem nihil deperit, nec accrescit, quia immobilis est, igitur esse ejus est totum simul. Ex his duobus apparet quod proprie est aeternus" (*ibid.*, cap. 8).

act reached by the argument from motion is *ipsum esse*, since all motion tends to *esse* as its ultimate act.¹⁰¹ This is said after *esse* had been explained as an act different, except in God, from the essence which is signified by the definition.¹⁰² To this ultimate act even essence is in potency.

From these passages it is clear that St. Thomas is looking upon all motion as ultimately a tendency towards *esse*. *Esse* is the act which is ultimate and to which every other act is potency. Even essence, except in God, is still potency to *esse*. The demonstration from act and potency, then, has to reach a pure act which is the act of *esse* alone. The entirely immobile movent, being pure act in this sense, can for St. Thomas be only the act of *esse* reached on the basis of an act not originally attained through that cognition by which corporeal things are known according to their essences.

The starting point of St. Thomas, accordingly, is wider than that of Aristotle. It includes an act which is not attained in the cognition of things according to their form. The inclusion of this act in the starting point vitally affects the whole course of the demonstration and makes the conclusion radically different. Motion, as analyzed by Aristotle, is merely a process towards form; for St. Thomas, it is a process towards a further and existential act. For Aristotle the act without potency, to which the argument finally concludes, can be only finite form. For St. Thomas the pure act has to be something over and beyond the order of form and finitude and is expressed by the infinitive *esse*.

The force of the Thomistic argument from motion, then, lies in its view of all movement from the standpoint of existential act. A thing cannot be being moved except through acquiring new existential act, and this ultimately can proceed only from the subsistent act of existing.

THE *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE*

The relation of the *prima via* in the *Summa Theologiae* to the Aristotelian reasoning from motion should be fairly clear from the

¹⁰¹"Item, ostensum est quod Deus est actus purus absque alicujus potentialitatis permixtione, oportet igitur quod ejus essentia sit ultimus actus: nam omnis actus qui est circa ultimum, est in potentia ad ultimum actum: ultimus autem actus est ipsum esse. Cum enim omnis motus sit exitus de potentia in actum, oportet illud esse ultimum actum, in quod tendit omnis motus . . ." (*ibid.*, cap. 11). Cf. texts in n. 139 in the third part of this article.

¹⁰²"In quocumque enim aliud est essentia, et aliud esse ejus, oportet quod aliud sit quo sit, et aliud quo aliquid sit, nam per esse suum de quolibet dicitur quod est, per essentiam vero suam de quolibet dicitur quid sit. Unde et definitio significans essentiam, demonstrat quid est res . . ." (*ibid.*).

foregoing survey. The *prima via* follows the lines of the first way from motion in the *Contra Gentiles*, restricting itself to the one essential proof given for each of the two propositions. The structure of the two propositions and their proofs, accordingly, are ultimately taken from Aristotle, as are also the examples used to illustrate them. But the eternity of the world and the animation of the heavens, essential to the Aristotelian way of reaching separate entity, do not enter into the demonstration; and the conclusion reached directly is at once seen to be the God of Christian revelation. Should not this mean that St. Thomas, here as in his other presentations of the demonstration, is looking upon the motion of sensible things as being ultimately actuated by a distinct existential *esse*? In this way the term of the procedure through act and potency will be a pure act which is the very act of existing, and not a finite form.

Does the context of the *prima via* bear out this anticipation?

In the first article of the Quaestio in which the *prima via* is located, God is said to be His own *esse*, with forward reference to the fourth article of the immediately following Quaestio.¹⁰³ There God's essence or nature or quiddity is shown to be His *esse*. The second proof given for this is from act and potency. *Esse* is the actuality of every form or nature. Goodness and humanity, for instance, are not expressed in act unless they are expressed as having *esse*. *Esse* therefore in such things is related to an essence which is other than itself as act to potency. Since in God there is nothing potential, as has been shown, He cannot have any essence different from His *esse*.¹⁰⁴

The act and potency envisaged in the *prima via*, accordingly, include essence as potency to the act of *esse*. Just as goodness or humanity,

¹⁰³"Deus enim est suum esse, ut infra patebit. Sed quia nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota: sed indiget demonstrari . . . per effectus" (*ST*, I, q. 2, a. 1).

¹⁰⁴"Secundo, quia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae: non enim bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus eam *esse*. Oportet igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad potentiam. Cum igitur in Deo nihil sit potentiale, ut ostensum est supra, sequitur quod non sit aliud in eo essentia quam suum esse" (*ibid.*, q. 3, a. 4).

Cf. "Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu; sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum" (*De Pot.*, VII, a. 2 ad 9).

"Quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc verbum EST, est communiter actualitas omnis formae, vel actus substantialis vel accidentalis . . ." (*In I Periherm.*, lect. 5 [Leonine no. 22]). Cf. also *CG*, II, cap. 54.

so the motion of sensible things seems to be looked upon as being in act through its *esse*.¹⁰⁵ Since every motion means a new participation in existential act, the immobile movent which is not being moved by anything can be only the subsistent act of existing. The act which is finally reached in the demonstration, then, is the act which in this sense is not being actuated by anything else, the subsistent act of *esse*.

How is this *esse* known?

The divine *esse*, St. Thomas explicitly states in this context, cannot be known by us insofar as *esse* signifies the act of being, just as the divine essence, with which it is identical, cannot be known to us. Only insofar as *esse* signifies the composition in a proposition can we know that the proposition which we form of God, when we say that God is, is true. This we know from His effects.¹⁰⁶

What is meant by this twofold way of expressing *esse*? How does the way of attaining the *esse* which is the act of being differ from the way of attaining the *esse* that is signified by the composition in a proposition?

Certainly the *esse* which is the act of being is not attained by the same cognition in which a thing is known according to its essence and expressed in its definition.¹⁰⁷ The act of being is grasped in the second operation of the intellect, in judgment.¹⁰⁸ This act, it is true, can also be later expressed in an act of simple intellection, when a judgment

¹⁰⁵Cf. the text in n. 101 above and those in n. 139 in the third part of this article.

¹⁰⁶"Dicendum quod *esse* dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, significat actum essendi; alio modo significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto. Primo igitur modo accipiendo *esse*, non possumus scire *esse* Dei, sicut nec eius essentiam: sed solum secundo modo. Scimus enim quod haec propositio quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus *Deus est*, vera est. Et hoc scimus ex eius effectibus, ut supra dictum est" (*ST*, I, q. 2, a. 4 ad 2). Cf. *CG*, I, cap. 12; *De Pot.*, VII, a. 2 ad 1.

¹⁰⁷Cf. "Quicquid enim non est de intellectu essentiae uel quiditatis hoc est adueniens extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia sine hiis que sunt partes essentiae intelligi potest. Omnis autem essentia uel quiditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de *esse* suo; possum enim intelligere quid est homo uel fenix et tamen ignorare an *esse* habeat in rerum natura" *De Ente*, cap. 4; ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. 34, ll. 7-14.

"In quocumque enim aliud est essentia, et aliud *esse* ejus, oportet quod aliud sit quo sit, et aliud quo aliquid sit, nam per *esse* suum de quolibet dicitur quod est, per essentiam vero suam de quolibet dicitur quid sit. Unde et definitio significans essentiam, demonstrat quid est res . . ." (*Compend. Theol.*, cap. 11).

¹⁰⁸Cf. E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pont. Inst. of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), pp. 190 ff. L.-M. Régis, approaching the question from the logical analysis given by St. Thomas, writes: "If we admit that 'to exist' can and must be known in and by a concept of apprehension, we also admit that there is a second knowledge of 'to exist' which comes after

is logically analyzed. It can be expressed by the concept of act. Just as form is to matter, so *esse* is to essence. In this way the concept of act, taken originally from form, may be extended analogously to the being which was attained originally in the judgment. In this way one may think and speak of "existence" or the "act of existing."

But this simple conception of *esse* does not permit one to affirm that the act of existing is being exercised.¹⁰⁹ That can only be judged. It is attained solely by the second operation of the intellect. Sensible things immediately present to the external senses are grasped in the act of judgment according to this actually exercised *esse*. The intellect irresistibly judges that they exist here and now. In this way one may be said to know their act of being, their *actus essendi*; namely, through the judgment, the second operation of the intellect. But this second operation of the intellect extends much further than the realm of things actually existing in the world. It is applied to whatever may be the object of a proposition, even regarding negations and privations where no essence is present that could be actuated by *esse* in the world of things.¹¹⁰ Moreover, from any true proposition to which the intellect has assented one may proceed by reasoning, the third operation, to

the first, controls, and completes it. This is affirmation, an act of judgment . . ." (THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, xxviii [Jan., 1951], 125).

Recent studies have shown that *as a matter of fact* St. Thomas never arrives at the distinction between essence and *esse* through reasoning from the limitation of act by potency. "Ce n'est, en effet, que postérieurement à la découverte de la composition essence-*esse* dans le créé, que Saint Thomas applique à cette composition le couple puissance-acte" (J. D. Robert, "Le Principe 'Actus non limitatur nisi per potentiam subjectivam realiter distinctam,'" *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, XLVII [1949], 68). "Thus act and potency take on the aspect of limitation only as a kind of *post factum* consequence, so to speak, not as a first principle" (W. Norris Clarke, "The Limitation of Act by Potency," *The New Scholasticism*, xxvi [1952], 192).

¹⁰⁹"Sed dicendum est quod cum duplex sit intellectus operatio, ut supra habitum est, ille qui dicit nomen vel verbum secundum se, constituit intellectum quantum ad primam operationem, quae est simplex conceptio alicuius, et secundum hoc, quiescit audiens, qui in suspenso erat antequam nomen vel verbum proferretur et eius prolatio terminaretur; non autem constituit intellectum quantum ad secundam operationem, quae est intellectus componentis et dividendis, ipsum verbum vel nomen per se dictum: nec quantum ad hoc facit quiescere audientem.

" . . . Probat autem consequenter per illa verba, quae maxime videntur significare veritatem vel falsitatem, scilicet ipsum verbum quod est *esse*, et verbum infinitum quod est *non esse*; quorum neutrum per se dictum est significativum veritatis vel falsitatis in re . . ." (*In I Periherm.*, lects. 3 and 5 [Leonine nos. 17-18]).

¹¹⁰Cf. *De Ente*, cap. 1; ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. 2, l. 8 and p. 3, l. 10.

acquire certitude about unknown things.¹¹¹

In the present context of the *Summa Theologiae*, the *esse* in both senses clearly refers to what is attained in the act of judgment, and not to knowledge in the order of essence. In the sense of the act of being, it is contrasted with knowledge of essence; we cannot know God's *esse* in this sense, just as we cannot know His essence. In the second sense it signifies composition, the joining together of subject and predicate, which pertains to the act of judgment. In both senses, according to the wording of the argument being answered, it must reply to the question *an sit*. The problem is to show that there is a sense in which we can know *an sit* of God without thereby knowing *quid sit*, even though God's essence is identical with His *esse*. If we could know the divine *esse* in the sense of the act of being, St. Thomas answers, we would thereby know the *quid sit*—something which in fact we do not know. But from His effects, we know that the proposition "God is" is true; and in this sense we reach the divine *esse*, without thereby knowing His act of being.

To know the divine *esse* as an act, accordingly, would seem to mean that one would grasp it immediately in the act of judgment, as one does the *esse* of sensible things. On the other hand, a reasoning from the *esse* of effects, affirmed in a true proposition, enables one to affirm with certitude the existence of the unknown cause, even though it does not give us knowledge of the essence of the cause. In the unique case of God the reasoning shows that His essence has to be identical with His *esse*; yet as an act this *esse* can remain unknown, even while being known as responding to the truth of the proposition attained with certitude; namely, that God exists.¹¹² But the divine *esse* attained in this way by the reasoning process is such that one has merely to

¹¹¹"Secunda vero ordinatur ad tertiam: quia videlicet oportet quod ex aliquo vero cognito, cui intellectus assentiat, procedatur ad certitudinem accipiendam de aliquibus ignotis" (*In I Periherm.*, proem. [Leonine no. 1]).

¹¹²Cf. Cajetan: "Cum autem de Deo scimus *an est*, dicimus scire esse quod significat veritatem propositionis, et nescire esse Dei: non quod terminus ultimus cognitionis nostrae sit esse propositionis, ut objectio intellexit (quoniam terminus est esse Dei, non absolute, sed ut respondet veritati propositionis); sed quia per hanc cognitionem non cognoscitur esse Dei propria questione qua est secundum se cognoscibile, quia non scitur per *quid*" (*In ST*, I, q. 2, a. 4, comm. v). Ferrariensis, *In CG*, I, cap. 12, comm. III: ". . . sed cognoscimus esse quod significat compositionem intellectus, idest, cognoscimus esse Deo convenire ut actualitatem essendi . . ." A.-D. Sertillanges, on the other hand, seems to minimize this bearing of the truth of the proposition on the actual *esse* of God: "Nous savons qu'il est; mais dans cette proposition: Dieu est, le verbe être ne signifie point l'être réel, l'être considéré à la façon d'un attribut; il n'est que le lien logique d'une proposition vraie . . . Cette affirmation: Dieu est, est une affirmation vraie,

proceed by the way of negation to develop the whole of one's philosophical knowledge of God.¹¹³

[To be continued]

non comme *qualifiant* Dieu au titre de l'être; mais comme *exigeant* Dieu en se fondant sur l'être" (S. Thomas d'Aquin, *Somme Théologique*, Dieu, [Paris: Desclée, 1926] pp. 383-84. Cf. also *Le Christianisme et les Philosophes* (Paris, Aubier), p. 269.

¹¹³Cf. CG, I, cap. 14; ST, I, q. 3, init. Also: "Inde est quod prima rerum principia non definimus nisi per negationes posteriorum; sicut dicimus quod punctum est, cuius pars non est; et Deum cognoscimus per negationes, inquantum dicimus Deum incorporeum esse, immobilem, infinitum" (*In X Metaphys.*, lect. 4 [Cathala, no. 1209]).

The case in general against an existential interpretation of the *prima via*, to quote a recent work, is that in the text "the literal development, the words and the statements, are not about composition of essence and existence nor do they speak of creation" (William Bryar, *St. Thomas and the Existence of God* [Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951], p. vii). But neither does any other of the *viae* speak of these, though they are involved in the probative force of the other four. The force of the *prima via*, as has been seen, lies in its treatment of act and potency. The act towards which sensible motion (as understood by St. Thomas) ultimately tends is existential, as is sufficiently clear from the preceding and following context and from comparison with the other versions of the argument; so the pure act reached by the *prima via* can be only the subsistent act of existing. Far from being "simply an extraordinarily loose literary rendering of St. Thomas's theme of the composite essence-existence and of the dependence of the composite on a creator God" (Bryar, p. vi), the *via* is a close and cogent expression of how actually existent motion has to originate from pure subsistent act, which (in the procedure of St. Thomas) can be only existential. The *via* is not explaining the creation of things, but the *motion* of things.

A particular objection is that "the argument for the second premise appears to operate by way of a presupposition of a multiplicity of agents, such a multiplicity being in fact incompatible with the creation or conservation *ex nihilo*" (Bryar, p. vii). But how is it incompatible with imparting *motion* that terminates in existential act? The reasoning is concerned not with creation or conservation, but with *motion* (at least, as the *via* appears in the *Summa Theologiae*). In St. Thomas's doctrine, the *proper* effect of the *primary* agent, *esse*, is imparted through motion *mediately*: "Igitur esse est quod agentia secunda agunt in virtute agentis primi" (CG, III, cap. 66; cf. also the text from this chapter quoted in the third part of this article, n. 139). In saying that the *prima via* is metaphysical and therefore deals with *being*, one should keep in mind that the *being* so meant is the *esse* of motion and its terminus. Likewise Mortimer Adler's conclusion that "hence no corporeal substance can *efficiently* cause the being of anything" ("The Demonstration of God's Existence," *The Thomist*, V [1943], 217), holds in creation and conservation, but not entirely in mediate causality through motion.

Bryar, using the tools of symbolic logic, finds that the text of the *prima via* allows three interpretations or explications, which "yield three demonstrations with a certain common likeness" (*St. Thomas and the Existence of God*, p. 150). None of the three coincides exactly with either of the traditional alternatives (*ibid.*, p. vii).

A CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF AUROBINDO'S BEING-BECOMING ABSOLUTE

PAUL COLAÇO, S.J.

I. THE VIEWPOINT OF CRITICISM

To anyone who has read our foregoing articles, it will have become amply clear that Aurobindo's whole structure of God rests on the basic principle that the absolute is essentially an inseparable, indivisible, but nevertheless a real *integrality*. His philosophy stands or falls with it. Destroy it, and you destroy at one stroke his theory of creation by involution, his theory of panpsychism and spiritual evolution, his theory of the emerging race of divine men leading a divine life. It is on the being-becoming God that he hinges all his ideas, and in that he thinks he has found the right key to the age-long problem of the one and the many.

But is his supposition that God is essentially one-many or being-becoming philosophically justifiable? We insist on the word *philosophically*. To one who professedly rides roughshod over logic and first principles of reasoning we have nothing to say. Irrationalism or alogicalism is not philosophy and cannot gain real supremacy over man,¹ even though it may temporarily catch the fancy of a misguided few. Man is essentially a rational being, and he is never satisfied with the answer that things are so because they are so or because some

This is the fifth article in a series of studies on the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo Ghose. The previous articles, which were an exposition of that philosophy, appeared in Volume XXVIII, pp. 291-300, and in Volume XXIX, pp. 29-41, 99-118, and 211-36.

¹In a very appreciative article on Annie Besant and the Theosophical Society, Dr. D. S. Sarma shows how Dr. Besant lost her hold on even her own followers when she introduced into theosophy the pseudo-mystical elements from occult science. Referring in particular to Dr. Besant's Brotherhood of the White Lodge, which watches over and guides the evolution of humanity, the learned writer remarks: "Naturally this assertion could not be taken seriously by many outside the Theosophical Society. And it is only fair to add that, even in the Society, it is not a

illuminati have said they are so. He wants to know—and that by a spontaneous urge of nature which can never be stifled for any length of time—why and how things are what they are.

We do not thereby imply that reason is the only source of knowledge for us. Faith certainly plays a large role in human life; we accept many things on the authority of men. And given a supernatural order—that is, an order which transcends not only human but all creatural possibilities or capacities² and which is not merely supra-physical³ or suprarational⁴—truths pertaining to that order cannot possibly be known except on the sole authority of God. Faith, then, becomes the only source of supernatural knowledge. And if the revelation of God manifests to man his obligation of tending towards the revealed supernatural order with the freely given grace of God and by God-appointed means, then faith is not only a source of knowledge but an indispensable means for man to attain his goal.

All this is obvious. But even faith, to have any hold on man, must carry with it its indubitable signs of credibility;⁵ in other words, its signs of reasonableness. If a truth of faith is intrinsically opposed to reason, then an act of faith in it is impossible. A higher truth supple-

compulsory article of faith." And he ends his article with the assertion that "most Hindus would have nothing to do with them now." Cf. *The Renaissance of Hinduism* (Benares: Hindu University, 1944), pp. 193-227.

²Christian theology makes a difference between the preternatural and supernatural orders. The former transcends human order but not all creatural order. Thus freedom from concupiscence transcends human possibilities but not angelic (purely intellectual beings without a body). The strict supernatural on the other hand absolutely transcends the sphere and power of all actual or possible creatures. Cf. Joseph Pohle, *God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural*, tr. by Arthur Preuss (London: B. Herder Book Co., 1915), pp. 179-89.

³Sri Aurobindo Ghose, *The Life Divine* (Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1939-40), II, Part II, 855. What surpasses matter is spiritual and not necessarily supernatural. The soul of man and of the angelic spirit are spiritual but not supernatural.

⁴*Ibid.*, II, Part II, 879. Suprarational is an ambiguous term. It may signify supernatural or preternatural or supranatural for a time through want of knowledge. Thus, for instance, aerial flight which is so natural in our times was up to a century ago quite a suprarational conception. Obviously Aurobindo uses supernatural in this last sense. For in his theory of evolution divinization of man is within the natural capacity of man. It is regarded by man as supernatural or supranatural because of his inherent ignorance. But this, as we have pointed out, is not supernatural in the strict sense of the word.

⁵"Before [man] can accept anything upon the authority of God, he must first of all have been convinced that there is God and that God has spoken" (Eric L. Mascall, *He Who Is* [Longmans, 1943], p. 271. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*. I, q. 2, a. 2 ad 2).

ments, elevates, or transfigures a lower truth but does not contradict it.

We have said all this to make the starting point of our criticism quite clear. We have no intention of inquiring whether what Aurobindo has told us about God is credible. We take it that his is a system of metaphysics, as his followers have so loudly proclaimed—a system of philosophy, and not a system of religion or mysticism.⁶ Our task therefore is to inquire whether what Aurobindo has told us about God is philosophical; that is, whether it is reasonable or not. Professor Malkani has very appropriately remarked that “after all it is the business of philosophy to be guided by reason alone and reason can only proceed on the basis of what we do actually know. Mysticism may be a legitimate activity of the human mind, but reason has no scope with regard to it, nor has philosophy.”⁷

II. THE LOGIC IN THE THEORY

To a casual reader of Aurobindo's words it might seem that his first premise, that the absolute is a universal being or a one-many God, is a wholly presumptuous and gratuitous supposition that hardly deserves philosophical attention. We are not of that opinion.

Aurobindo began excellently in taking a firm initial stand on the reality of the world. There has always been on the part of the Vedantists a scruple about giving the world its due reality for fear of compromising the Upanishadic “One without a second.” Madhava was the first to affirm a real world eternally side by side with Brahman. But he did that at the sacrifice of unity and, as Dr. Ghate remarks, by a “fantastic and forced interpretation of the sutras.”⁸

Aurobindo, on the other hand, wants to stick by all means to the strict unity of Brahman enjoined by the scriptures. But he claims that within the framework of divine unity one could give the world a full-blooded reality. Whether in the system of Aurobindo the world

⁶Mr. Anilbaran Roy, issuing a call to Indian universities to reform their syllabus of philosophy of graduate courses, wrote as follows in the “Sri Aurobindo Darshan Supplement,” *Indian Express*, Aug. 15, 1940: “For the paper of Metaphysics, we have not the least hesitation in recommending Sri Aurobindo's ‘Magnum opus’, ‘The Life Divine’. This is not a book on Indian Philosophy, as, unlike Indian Philosophy in general, it does not depend on the ‘Śruti’ as an authority but on pure reason, and is thus metaphysics *par excellence* . . . satisfying fully the logical intellect of man. ‘The Life Divine’ is preeminently the philosophy of the Modern Age.” For other similar statements, cf. *Aurobindo Mandir Annual*, esp. 1942.

⁷*Philosophical Quarterly* (Calcutta), April, 1943, p. 8.

⁸V. S. Ghate, *The Vedānta* (“Govt. Oriental Series,” Class C, No. 1; Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1926) p. 33.

receives that full reality which he intends to give it, is quite another question, which will receive our attention a little later. At present what we need to appreciate is that at least in intention Aurobindo is a realist and not a mere dreamer of dreams and seer of visions.

Aurobindo's attack, therefore, on illusionism is a healthy common-sense effort to draw India from what he himself calls "the shadow of the great refusal." Christian philosophy, which prides itself on its rational and common-sense view of life and life's problems has ever adhered with tenacity to the fact of the reality of the world and has fought against all idealistic, phenomenalistic, and skeptical philosophies.

This right philosophical orientation taken at the start led Aurobindo to a yet more fruitful affirmation; namely, that the world was not a pure being but was in perpetual movement, in a state of continual becoming. In his own characteristic fashion he described his experiences as follows:

When we withdraw our gaze from its egoistic preoccupation with limited and fleeting interests and look upon the world with dispassionate and curious eyes that search only for the Truth, our first result is the perception of a boundless energy of infinite existence, infinite activity, infinite movement pouring itself out in limitless Space, in eternal Time.⁹

Again, "All phenomenal existence resolves itself into Force, into a movement of energy."¹⁰

This observation is worthy of note—not that having observed a real movement of energy in the world is in itself a great achievement, but it is a good start in philosophy. For, as a French writer puts it,

La première chose qui frappe l'observateur appliqué à l'étude de la nature, c'est l'existence du mouvement et des changements qui en résultent. S'il lève ses regards vers les cieux, il voit ces globes de lumière qui, nuit et jour, se meuvent avec une régularité inaltérable à travers les espaces éthérés. S'il baisse les yeux sur la terre, tout lui paraît sujet à une alternative perpétuelle de production et de destruction.¹¹

And Aristotle simply defines the world as an ensemble of moving things and wisely adds that he who ignores motion in the world ignores nature itself.¹²

⁹*Life Divine*, I, 108.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 121.

¹¹Mgr. Albert Farges, *Théorie fondamentale de l'acte et la puissance* (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1891, 1893), p. 50. Cf. St. Augustine, *Confessions*, iv, 10.

¹²*Physics* iii. 1.

And yet this is precisely the aspect that has been ignored by Indian philosophers. They have been so powerfully drawn by the mystic silence of the absolute being that they have never stopped to inquire with any seriousness the nature of the evident fact of the becoming in the world. With the exception of Nyaya-Vaisesika, which admitted real effectivity,¹³ most other systems thought they had said the last word on the matter of movement or becoming by affirming that it is all a manifestation, real (*satkaryavada*) or unreal (*vivartthevada*), of the effect already contained in a subtle form but formally in the first cause, Brahman. Their one preoccupation has been "to prove that all effects must be derived from a material cause."¹⁴

It must be owned, to the credit of Sankara, that he clearly apprehended that all becoming or change or modification implied an imperfection. Hence he resolutely fought against the *parinamavada*, or self-modification, in the pure being of Brahman.¹⁵ But he, too, did not stop to analyze the constituent element of becoming or make an attempt to find a relation between being and becoming. He took the easier path of despising the becoming.

It is this evasion of the issue on the part of India's prince of philosophers that made Aurobindo pass this harsh but just judgment on Sankara:

In the philosophy of Sankara, one feels the presence of a conflict, an opposition which this powerful intellect has stated with full force and masterfully arranged rather than solved with any finality—the conflict of an intuition intensely aware of an absolutely transcendent and inmost Reality and a strong intellectual reason regarding the world with a keen and vigorous rational intelligence. . . . Sankara takes up this contradiction, this opposition which is normal to our mental consciousness when it becomes aware of both sides of existence and stands between them; he resolves it by obliging the reason to acquiesce in the soul's intuition of the transcendent Reality and to support, by a dialectic which ends by dissolving the whole cosmic phenomenal and rational-practical edifice of things . . . its escape from the limitation, constructed and imposed on the mind by Maya.¹⁶

¹³"As opposed to the *parinama* and *Satkarya* doctrine . . . the Veiseika and the Nyaya are exponents of the *arambha* and the *asatkarya* doctrines, which maintain a creation, absolute and new. Thus according to them the effect is absolutely different from the cause, is never present in the cause" (Ghate, *The Vedanta*, p. 18).

¹⁴"Light of the East Series" (Calcutta), May, 1943, p. 69.

¹⁵Sankara Bhashya, I. 4. 5; I. 1. 11: "Free from all limiting conditions whatever" (*Sacred Books of the East*, ed. by Max Müller).

¹⁶*Life Divine*, II, Part I, 253-54.

Aurobindo therefore has done the right thing in asserting in unqualified terms that both being and becoming are facts and that true wisdom lies, not in denying the one or the other, but in trying to find the right relation between the two.¹⁷

His conclusions about God in His aspect of being do not differ very much from those of the other Vedantists. Like them he has told us that the absolute is a pure being, self-existent, immutable, perfect, and eternal and the first cause and last end of all finite things. All this no one can gainsay, as it is in perfect conformity with natural theology.

Even the three attributes of *sat*, *chit*, and *ananda* are not false as far as the affirmations go. But it is in their negations that the Vedantists sin against God. We may in this connection profitably quote the following observation of Father Dandoy.

The Vedantic conception of Brahman must not be identified with our Christian conception of God. Thus to mention only the most important differences: Brahman (i) is so much being that it is *only* being—Being is conceived by the Vedantists not as a *genus*, still less as an *analogatum* but as the one substratum that gives “beingness” to all that is or seems to be; (ii) although “intellectual” light—causing to see and think—it is not self-conscious, i.e., it does not know itself—for the Advaitists deny what we call “reflexion”, the return of consciousness on itself; (iii) therefore it is not happy in our sense of the term. *Ananda* means that it is the “final cause”, that wherein we find Joy, not what enjoys it. . . . Correct in its affirmations, the Advaita teaching on God the Supreme is therefore very incorrect in its negations.¹⁸

What Father Dandoy has remarked about the Advaitists applies also, *mutatis mutandis*, to Aurobindo. It is true Aurobindo does not make God the sole being. He grants to finite creatures a modal being. But God remains, nevertheless, their essential substratum. As for consciousness, he departs from the ordinary Vedantic conception of

¹⁷*Ibid.*, chap. 1.

¹⁸This is from an essay on the doctrine of the unreality of the world in the Advaita. This view is not shared by M. Lacombe. He is of opinion that the *sat*, according to Sankara, interiorizes itself and reaches the self of the substance. Hence *chit* is not pure intellectual light but knowledge that is transparent to itself without reference to an object or a subject or any internal duality. “La connaissance est transparence à soi-même, conscience indépendamment de toute référence à un objet ou à un sujet et donc sans repli ni dualité internes.” Consequently he argues that such a self-transcendent thinking being could not but be experiencing the joy of beatitude together with perfect detachment. “Doit être beinheureuse d’une béatitude positivement éprouvé et renoncée tout ensemble” (Olivier Lacombe, *L’absolu selon le Védanta* [Paris: P. Geuthner, 1937], 118-20).

a pure divine luminosity and seems to grant self-knowledge to the absolute being. He says that God knows Himself by self-evident knowledge, as all absolutes must. But at the same time he takes care to tell us that it is not objective knowledge; that is to say, not a knowledge of self even in a real, eminent sense as we understand it. As for *ananda*, Aurobindo does not entirely identify God's bliss with the final term of my realization of it, but like Christian philosophy seems to attribute joy and bliss to the absolute itself—inasmuch as—to quote his own words—“absoluteness of conscious existence is illimitable bliss of conscious existence . . . all illimitableness, all infinity, all absoluteness is pure delight . . . full possession of its infinite and illimitable self-consciousness and self-power; a self-possession whose other name is self-delight.”¹⁹ Nevertheless, one feels that this is the cold bliss of an impersonal God and not the Christian God of love who thoroughly knows Himself as the most perfect being and therefore truly loves Himself with an infinite love and is capable of loving all who in any way participate in His being.

All Vedantists have failed to find a truly personal God because they have not grasped the true notion of divine transcendence. They have no doubt called Brahman transcendent; but the transcendence they have attributed to him is either a transcendence of inequality or a transcendence in degree, but not transcendence in kind, the transcendency of the *analogatum primum*. Aurobindo is no exception to this. In spite of his attempt to attribute personal qualities to God, his God remains a cold impersonality or at best a midway God between the unknowable blank reality and a truly personal God possessing knowledge and love.

The novelty of Aurobindo's concept of the absolute does not so much lie in his concept of it as being as in his concept of it as becoming. It is the keystone of his philosophy, and by making it an essential perfection of God he feels he has restored to Indian philosophy both balance and integrality. Hence to form a right estimate of his philosophy it is necessary to give our best attention to it.

Prescinding for the present from the rightness or wrongness of his attribution of real becoming to God—we shall discuss that presently—we think Aurobindo has rendered a real service to Indian speculation in insisting that the solution of the problem of the one and the many was to be sought along the path of movement rather than in placid contemplation of a qualityless (*Nirguna*) Brahman. That is the way

¹⁹*Life Divine*, I, 138.

the Greeks pursued their inquiry and finally came to build up an admirable system of metaphysics.

Not only did Aurobindo choose the right path, but his first findings were logical and in accord with experience. He found that he could not approve, for instance, the idea "that all is movement and our conception of the stable is only an artifice of our mental consciousness."²⁰ Nor does the idea "that existence consists only in the action of (conscious) energy"²¹ appear to him to agree with facts. Rather, like Plato, he tells us that "behind the veil of continually fleeting becomings . . . there is that in us which is not involved at all in the becoming."²² "Change represents," he remarks again, "the constant shifting of apparent relations in an eternal Immutability"²³ "of something indefinable,"²⁴ the "secret foundation of the play of movement."²⁵ He notices also that that basic something "is untouched and unaffected by the mutabilities . . . it supports the clash of relations"²⁶; it is "essentially free from all limitation by qualities, properties, features" and is "to our perception an indeterminate, if not indeterminable."²⁷

All these probings into the facts of becoming led him to his final conclusion that "the very conception of movement carries with it the potentiality of repose and betrays itself as an activity of some existence."²⁸

²⁰*Ibid.*, I, 112. Perhaps Aurobindo has in mind Henri Bergson. On pages 117-18, without mentioning the name of Bergson, Aurobindo gives almost verbatim Bergson's definition of duration and rejects it as being opposed to "supreme experience and supreme intuition." Duration according to Bergson is that "in which the past always moving on, is swelling unceasingly with a present that is absolutely new" (*Creative Evolution*, tr. by Arthur Mitchell [New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911], p. 210). So great is his insistence on movement as the reality of duration that "even matter looked at as an undivided whole must be a flux rather than a thing" (*ibid.*, 196).

²¹*Life Divine*, I, 138. Whether this is a reference to Hegel one cannot say with any definiteness. The whole of Hegel's philosophy is summed up in his cryptic saying, "Logic coincides with Metaphysics." Cf. *The Logic of Hegel*, tr. by William Wallace (2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), p. 45. Dr. Maitra has made an interesting study between Aurobindo and Hegel, and he is of the opinion that, though Aurobindo has been largely influenced by Hegel, still he does not agree with Hegel that the world is a mere continuity of thought. Cf. *Sri Aurobindo Mandir Annual*, August 15, 1946.

²²*Life Divine*, I, 118. Cf. Plato *Timaeus* 50A ff.

²³*Isha Upanishad* (2d ed.; Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1924), p. 25.

²⁴*The Riddle of the World* (1st ed.; Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1933), p. 77.

²⁵*Isha Upanishad*, p. 57.

²⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

²⁷*Life Divine*, II, Part I, 59.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 3.

This conclusion is certainly right. Unless we want to make mysteries of nothing, little reflection is needed to show that all accidental perfections that appear and disappear require necessarily a basic substance in which they naturally inhere. An accident, by definition, is that "mode of a real being which is found to have its reality, not by existing in itself, but by affecting, determining some substance in which it inheres as in a subject."²⁹ St. Thomas, following Aristotle, has rightly called an accident an "entity of an entity."³⁰

Since the whole essence of an accident consists in determining, affecting, and modifying the substance, our mind, seeing the accidental transformation of things, immediately apprehends that there is such a thing as a basic reality which supports these changes and in which the modifications truly inhere.

This is so universally true that in general the world has never taken seriously the empiricists like Hume, who have tried to explain the reality of things by a mere successive collocation of phenomenal forms. Aurobindo, referring to such empiricism, has very pointedly and justly remarked that it is opposed to pure reason, because it "leaves my perceptions unsatisfied, contradicts my fundamental seeing, and therefore cannot be. For it brings us to a last abruptly ceasing stair of an ascent which leaves the whole stair-case without support, suspended in the Void."³¹

We have so far seen how the conclusions of Aurobindo hang together in a logical unity. His reasoning has been accurate and along right lines. But now comes the great twist in his reasoning, the consequences of which have been most disastrous for his philosophy.

III. THE FUNDAMENTAL ERROR

Aurobindo's conclusion that there is some secret foundation or substance that supports movement and change is, as we have seen, legitimate; but where he erred was in concluding, like Spinoza, that that substance was essentially one being,³² "a pure absolute,"³³ "pure existence eternal, infinite, indefinable,"³⁴ "impersonal Divine,"³⁵

²⁹Peter Coffey, *Ontology; or, The Theory of Being* (London; New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1914), p. 232.

³⁰"Solae substantiae proprie et vere dicuntur entia . . . accidens magis entis quam ens" (*Summa Theol.*, I, q.90, a.2). Cf. *De Ente et Essentia*, cap. 7: "Est ens secundum quid."

³¹*Life Divine*, I, 114-15.

³²*Isha Upanishad*, p. 44.

³³*Life Divine*, I, 115.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 118-19.

³⁵*The Riddle of the World*, p. 65.

“pure substance of the nature of the Being.”³⁶

Possibly Aurobindo's readings of the moderns, more especially of Spinoza,³⁷ whose philosophy received so much attention in London schools at the time Aurobindo studied in England, led him to this erroneous conclusion.

It is erroneous because it is against the testimony of the selfsame pure reason which prompted Aurobindo to reject the theory that the world is a pure becoming or succession of forms. Reason and experience testify that one being is different from another—that a tree is not a dog and a dog is not a man. In each species, again, one clearly distinguishes one individual from another—Peter from Paul, one *margosa* tree from another.

This testimony of reason, based on evident facts of experience, is reinforced in man, who, as Aurobindo himself admits, is capable of introspection and reflection and is therefore self-conscious. Now, every human being is fully conscious that his thoughts, desires, intentions, and actions are his own and nobody else's; he alone stands responsible for them before God and man. That is why, if the theory of *panta rhei* (“all is flow”) makes no appeal to reflecting men, the theory of pantheism (all is God-substance) provokes an indignant protest from self-respecting men. And the reason for this is plain. Deny man his individual subsistence, and you deny him his claim to nobility, self-determination, and responsibility. He is reduced to a mere plaything of a playful God or, worse still, a helpless victim of a universal will, a *kismet* or *karma* or *lila*.

Why did Aurobindo, who so logically deduced that all is not a pure becoming in the world, deduce illogically that all is one substance in the world, the conscious substance of God manifested phenomenally in many forms and shapes? So powerful a thinker could not have gone wrong on such an obvious point. We have presumed to hint above that Spinoza's teachings might have had their influence on him.

³⁶*Life Divine*, II, Part II, 1068.

³⁷The idea of a universal substratum is not foreign to Indian thought. The Vedantists in general have always maintained it. But they did not arrive at that notion by analyzing becoming, as Aurobindo does. Besides, extension of thought or consciousness in modal forms, the kernel of Spinoza's doctrine, is also the fundamental idea in Aurobindo. Again like Spinoza, Aurobindo explains the manifestation of the world as a conditioning of the unconditioned. There is however an element of dynamism in Aurobindo's teaching, the transfiguration of modes which does not seem to be particularly like Spinoza. In this, as Dr. Maitra suggests, Hegelian doctrine might have had its influence (*Aurobindo Mandir Annual*, August 15, 1946).

But that influence, if any, has not been of such a nature as to make him a blind disciple of Spinoza; it has not destroyed his independent thinking. Thus, for instance, instead of Spinoza's geometrical theory of the manifestation of the Substance,³⁸ we find in Aurobindo a dynamic process which is nearer to Hegelianism or Bergsonianism.

Aurobindo gives us a clue to the real reason of his conclusion in a passing but very significant statement: "The first movement of self-realization is the sense of unity with the other existence in the universe."³⁹ In other words, the feeling of oneness has evidently weighed heavily with him against the sense of the distinctness of realities.

What is this sense of oneness that he has experienced in the universe and that has led him to the affirmation of a universal substance? Perhaps it is the abstract universal notion of being, the *ens commune*, of the Scholastics, that he is identifying with a universal substance. That possibility is not excluded. It is obvious that whatever is or can be, is grasped by our mind as a being. It is the first and primary object of our intellect.⁴⁰ That is why the extension of this notion of being is so wide that it is termed by the Scholastics the transcendental notion of being.⁴¹ It must be admitted, therefore, that the way from a notional being to a universal reality is tempting to the unwary.

Nevertheless, a closer study of the statement and others quoted in a previous page⁴² shows that the oneness to which Aurobindo refers is not, at least directly, the oneness of the transcendental notion of being, but rather the common substratum of movement or becoming. Thus he tells us that "the oneness so realised is a pluralistic unity,"⁴³ that "the motion of the world works under the government of a perpetual stability";⁴⁴ it is the "secret foundation of the play of movement"; "it is untouched and unaffected by the mutabilities, etc.";

³⁸Cf. Benedicti de Spinoza, *Opera*, Vols. III-IV, *Principia Philosophiae More Geometrico Demonstrata*, ed. by J. Van Vloten and J. P. N. Land (3d. ed.; The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1882-3) pp. 110 ff.

³⁹*Isha Upanishad*, p. 45.

⁴⁰"Illud quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, I, art. 1).

⁴¹The notion of being is called transcendental not in the sense that it supersedes creation but in the sense that it transcends all limits of application. Its only limit is pure nothingness. Father Arnou in his *Metaphysica Generalis*, p. 72, makes the following observation: "Transcendens ergo dicitur notio entis, non sensu moderno (iuxta quem illud est transcendens, quod superat omnem experientiam possibilem), sed quia in sua extensione includit omnia quae contradictionem non dicunt, et propterea latius patet quam omnes notiones genericae."

⁴²Cf. nn. 21-28.

⁴³*Isha Upanishad*, p. 44.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 25.

it is "to our perception an indeterminate, if not indeterminable."⁴⁵

We are not surprised that Aurobindo is "perplexed"⁴⁶ by the underlying continuity of oneness or sameness behind all becoming or movement. Long before him Plato, too, had been puzzled by it. He was the first among the Greeks to realize that becoming in the sensible world is not merely a *complex* but a *composite* affair. That is to say, by observing the phenomenon of becoming more intently he saw that

all finite existences . . . [were] . . . a kind of compromise between the limited and the unlimited . . . between a law which would regulate all things and confine them within definite bounds and a vague indeterminate material or basis of phenomenal existence, which has no law in itself and, therefore, must receive the determination from without.⁴⁷

In other words, he realized that every real change implied some common indeterminate subject that remained the same through the change and something else that appeared and disappeared, giving that common substratum a particular determination or perfection at each change.

It did not take Plato long to determine upon the principle of perfection. He knew that the eternal Ideas were models of perfection and all perfection anywhere must be an imitation of them, the more so as in the sensible world the perfection was "ever coming into being and perishing and never really was."⁴⁸

But what was that indeterminate principle that remained the same in all change? Plato was quite sure that it was not nothing, though it had all the appearances of a nonbeing. In his *Timaeus* he points out that this nonbeing-like principle of change

must be always regarded as the same, it never itself assumes a form like any of these things that enter into it. It indeed is the original recipient of all impressions . . . eternal and indestructible but [it] provides a seat for all the changeful forms of existence, and . . . is apprehended without the aid of sense, by a kind of spurious reason,⁴⁹ and is hard to believe in.⁵⁰

⁴⁵The references have already been given above.

⁴⁶*Life Divine*, II, Part I, 7.

⁴⁷Edward Caird, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers* ("The Gifford Lectures," 2 vols.; Glasgow: J. MacLehose & Sons, 1904), p. 226.

⁴⁸Plato *Timaeus* 27E ff.

⁴⁹By "spurious reason" Plato does not understand false reasoning, but that the indeterminate principle is not directly grasped by us—for what is grasped by us is always a perfection—and that its existence is apprehended by us in an indirect way in the sense that change is unintelligible without such an underlying substratum.

⁵⁰*Timaeus* 50A ff.; 52A ff.

Though Plato was quite sure of its existence, he was not at all sure of its nature. He called it matter;⁵¹ he called it space.⁵² But nearly always he conceived it, as

a non-being in some manner existing. For he sometimes confuses it with privation, sometimes with possibility, sometimes on the contrary with imperfect act. That is why the Platonic conception of the matter and of non-being remains always obscure.⁵³

But whereas Plato's innate sense of beauty and perfection forbade him to identify this mysterious thing with any of the spotless divine Ideas—for he instinctively felt that what was indeterminate, a principle of limitation, could not be a principle of perfection—Aurobindo mistook it for a pure being and identified it with the absolute substance or being of God.

IV. THE ARISTOTELIAN-THOMISTIC ANALYSIS OF BECOMING

Is this common substratum, which we apprehend in all change or becoming, a being? And if it is a being at all, can it be the being of God? Let us turn to Aristotle for an answer. He is essentially a philosopher of becoming, and it is his singular merit to have unbarred the nature of the mystery of becoming which had so much puzzled the Greek philosophers since Parmenides.⁵⁴

Parmenides had said that

nothing ever becomes . . . Becoming and movement are impossible [because] if anything ever becomes, however trifling, the same difficulty always recurs. Does it come out of being or out of non-being? If out of being, then it already is; if out of non-being, then you fall into a contradiction, since non-being is nothing and cannot be the source of being.⁵⁵

Aristotle met this objection by postulating a potency⁵⁶ which was an intermediary between actual being and sheer nothingness. And this postulate of his was fully justified by the nature of change. "A becoming without a 'subject' which remains unaltered throughout the process of change, would no longer be a becoming for at each instant

⁵¹*Sophist* 241D; 257A; 259C.

⁵²*Timaeus* 52A ff.

⁵³Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., "Fondement de la distinction de Puissance et Acte selon S. Thomas", *New Scholasticism*, 1 (1927), 320.

⁵⁴"No one," says Etienne Gilson, "has ever better discerned the mystery that the very familiarity of movement hides from our eyes" (*The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, tr. by A. H. C. Downes [London: Sheed & Ward, 1936], p. 66).

⁵⁵Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, I, Frag. 6-8.

⁵⁶*Physics* i. 8.

there would be both annihilation and creation."⁵⁷ On the other hand, if the subject actually possessed the perfection to be achieved, it could not be in movement, for movement or becoming signifies a transition from undetermined being to determined being. Therefore the subject must be in potency to the new perfection, because "change implies a being which develops and grows . . . That possibility of growth is not intelligible except in a being which is susceptible of growth."⁵⁸ Herein, then, lay the clue to the vexing dilemma of Parmenides that "a being is or is not." Aristotle now could reply that between being and nonbeing there is a third possibility, "being in potency."

Aristotle called this potency matter.⁵⁹ Professor Stace has very rightly pointed out that "a very natural mistake would be to suppose that by matter Aristotle meant the same as we do, namely physical substance such as wood or iron . . . Our ordinary idea of matter as physical substance is an absolute conception."⁶⁰ That is to say, we understand by matter a subject which, though complete in itself as a substance, is yet in potency to acquiring accidental perfections. But beings are subject not only to accidental changes but also to substantial changes. And substantial changes show that there is a more fundamental substratum, a prime matter, which "is not a thing,⁶¹ but only an element recognized by analysis as involved in the being of a thing."⁶² It is not empty space, as Plato thought,⁶³ nor a logical possibility, which is no more than an absence of contradiction,⁶⁴ but a

⁵⁷Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *God, His Existence and Nature* (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1934), p. 169.

⁵⁸André Marc, "Being and Action," *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, XXVIII (March, 1951), 175. Cf. Marianne Therese Miller, "The Problem of Action in the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas on the *Physics* of Aristotle," *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, XXIII (March, 1946), 135-6.

⁵⁹*Physics* i. 7; *Metaphysics* M.2; *De Generatione et Corruptione* i. 1.

⁶⁰W. T. Stace, *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy* (1st ed.; London: Macmillan Co., 1920), p. 276.

⁶¹Aristotle *Metaphysics* Z. 3. Matter is here defined as "nec quid, nec quale, nec quantum, nec aliquid eorum quibus ens determinatur." This does not mean that it is nothing. A.-D. Sertillanges rightly warns: "Ce ne sera pas la jeter au néant; car le néant n'est rien, et un pouvoir est quelque chose. N'est-ce donc rien, pour le bronze, que de pouvoir être coulé en statue? . . . De même, le matière, pur néant de détermination, n'est pas néant tout court, mais puissance" (*St. Thomas d'Aquin* [4th ed.; Paris: Alcan, 1925], II, 12). Cf. St. Thomas, *In I Physicorum*, lect. 9.

⁶²W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Physics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 47.

⁶³St. Thomas, *In IV Physicorum*, lect. 3.

⁶⁴"Cependant il ne faudrait pas confondre la puissance passive avec ce qu'on appelle quelque fois la *puissance objective*; ou mieux la *possibilité intrinsèque*. Cette dernière se définit: 'la non-répugnance à la existence'. Elle n'est qu'une puissance logique, aussi peu réelle que le possible lui-même

real physical capacity,⁶⁵ a pure potentiality, which in a complete substance becomes actual by means of the substantial form.

Once he had discovered this principle by which a being becomes, or a thing comes into being, Aristotle explained every sensible change in the world as a passage from potency to act and therefore explained motion as "the act of a being in potency in so far as it is in potency,"⁶⁶ or also as "the act of an imperfect subject."⁶⁷

This fundamental insight into the nature of the substratum of becoming led Aristotle to further important conclusions. He saw clearly that what is in potency cannot by itself pass into motion, for then it would be both in act and in potency with regard to the same thing, which obviously goes against the principle of contradiction. He therefore concluded that, for a consistent explanation of becoming, the primacy of the act over potency must necessarily be supposed.

It is evident that logically the act precedes the potency. For it is by the possibility of a being in act that a thing is possible . . . It is then necessary that the definition and the notion of the act should precede the definition and the notion of potency.⁶⁸

Having arrived thus far in his analysis of becoming, Aristotle observed that all sensible things are subject to change, therefore composed of an act and a potency, and hence need to be moved by an active power,⁶⁹ and that again by another active power and, in the final analysis, by an active supreme power, which is its own activity and always absolutely the same. In other words, right at the origin of this changeable world there must be a pure act, a *motor immobilis*, that could communicate motion to all things but did not need to be moved itself.⁷⁰

dans l'état de possibilité. Quant à la passive, elle suppose un sujet déjà réel, et elle doit sa réalité à la réalité de son sujet" (De Regnon, *Métaphysique des causes* [Paris: Retaux-Bray, 1886], pp. 241-42).

⁶⁵St. Thomas, *In I Physicorum*, lect. 13. "En effet, une synthèse d'être et de néant serait une absurdité: le seul non-être compossible avec l'être, c'est le non-être relatif, la puissance, que est 'aptitude à être', 'appel (indéterminé) d'être'" (J. Maréchal, *Le Point de départ de la métaphysique* [Paris: Alcan, 1927] V, 245, n. 2). "Ce que l'airain à la statue, la matière pure l'est à la substance" (A.-D. Sertillanges, *St. Thomas d'Aquin*, p. 10).

⁶⁶*Physics* iii. 1. 2. A very lucid explanation of this argument is given by St. Thomas in his commentary on this passage.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*

⁶⁸*Metaphysics* @. 8.

⁶⁹"All movement comes from a mover and the mover is already in act" (*Physics* vii. 1). Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 2, a. 3, and q. 82, a. 4.

⁷⁰*Physics* viii. 6; *Metaphysics* Δ. 7. Mgr. Farges makes this useful remark: ". . . cet 'immobile' n'est pas pour nous un terme simplement

This is the keystone of his philosophy. A right analysis of change led him finally to a transcendent cause, not in the sense of the highest or first in a series of causes, but a first cause that is simply out of the chain of all causes real or possible—a cause that cannot be classed under any genus of causes but simply transcends every cause inasmuch as it has nothing of potency in it.⁷¹ It is a cause in an eminent sense, since, unmoved itself, it can move all other beings (causes), and “in the absence of [it] nothing will be moved and there will be no movement in the world . . . unless, indeed, we should ever observe an axe or a saw operating without the operation of a carpenter.”⁷²

St. Thomas saw in Aristotle's principle of act and potency greater possibilities than Aristotle himself had.⁷³ Aristotle limited the application of these principles to local and sensible change—in other words, to natures in the physical order. St. Thomas lifted them up to a metaphysical plane⁷⁴ by showing that not only are all finite physical natures composed of act and potency, but that in the very order of existence itself, the gradation of being can only be explained on the basis that being, which is the greatest of all perfections,⁷⁵ is received in different potencies. And he further explained that the potencies with

negatif, une absence de tel ou tel mouvement, mais qu'il est en outre, à une autre point de vue, un acte, une energie positive et une causalité d'une autre espèce . . . moteur toujours en acte, acte pur, sans aucune passage de la puissance à l'acte” (*Théorie fondamentale de l'acte et la puissance*, p. 130).

⁷¹“Necesse est id quod est primum ens, esse in actu, et nullo modo in potentia. Ostensum est autem supra [q. 2, a. 3] quod Deus est primum ens. Impossibile est igitur quod in Deo sit aliquid in potentia” (St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, q. 3, a. 1).

⁷²Etienne Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, tr. by Edward Bullough; ed. by Rev. G. A. Elrington, O.P. [St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1941], pp. 71-72.

⁷³“It seems to me,” writes Father Bremond, “that one exaggerates the merit of Aristotle in having placed the idea in the things. What happens to Platonic participation if there is not that immanence of the idea? . . . His admirable theory of the act suffers from his anti-Platonism . . . Aristotle forgets to speak of participation, a Platonic word which he has proscribed . . . but, isolated from Platonism, the causality of the Pure Act, as Aristotle understands it, is incomplete.” Father Bremond goes on to show how St. Thomas, using Plato's idea of participation and combining it with Aristotle's theory of act and potency, achieved a true synthesis in philosophy. Cf. *Gregorianum* (June, 1931), pp. 269-71.

⁷⁴Professor Gilson is of the opinion that Aristotle reached the notion of a general cause of the substance of beings but not the notion of a creative cause, of being or existence as such. (Cf. *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, p. 69). This view is not shared by Father Jolivet, who is of the opinion that Aristotle had come to a real knowledge of creation *ex nihilo*. (Cf. *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, 1930, p. 210).

⁷⁵“Dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium. Comparatur

reference to being could only be the different natures with their different capacities of receiving being. In purely spiritual beings, like the angels, there is only one composition; namely, of nature and being. In corporeal beings there is a double composition, of matter and form in the order of nature and of nature and being in the order of existence. With the aid of these principles St. Thomas was able to show how the universe is an ordered hierarchy of distinct participated beings. Being is one and indivisible. Creatures are not fully beings, but participated beings, for they are composed of an act and a potency; the being subsists in them according to their varying degrees of potency. That is what is meant by participation. "‘Participare’ nihil aliud est," says St. Thomas, "quam partialiter accipere."⁷⁶ Hence neither act nor potency, which are constitutive elements of being, are beings by themselves; they are incomplete beings or, more correctly, correlative principles⁷⁷ by which a finite being is constituted. Hence they have to be "concreated"⁷⁸ or created simultaneously when a being is to be effected. Hence also the *motor immobilis* of Aristotle manifests itself in the analysis of St. Thomas as the supreme being who is the creator of all finite or participated beings.⁷⁹

enim ad omnia ut actus: nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi in quantum est. Unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum" (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 4, a. 1 ad 3).

⁷⁶*Expositio in Libros de Caelo et Mundo*, I, lect. 22. Cf. *In I Metaphysicorum*, lect. 5. The notion of participation, though not explained, is implied in many of the writings of Plato, especially in his *Symposium*, chap. 29.

⁷⁷Aimé Forest, *La structure métaphysique du concret selon St. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1911), p. 17.

⁷⁸*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 45, a. 4 ad 2.

⁷⁹"Si enim aliquid invenitur in aliquo per participationem, necesse est quod causetur in ipso ab eo cui essentialiter convenit" (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 44, a. 1; cf. *ibid.*, q. 45, a. 2). Professor Gilson has some pertinent remarks about this. He says: "... if God created merely by using some pre-existing matter, this matter would not be caused by Him. Therefore, to say that God is the universal Cause of all being, taken in its totality, is to affirm that God is capable of creating" (*The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, p. 134). A few lines ahead of this passage (*ibid.*, pp. 133-34) he writes: "The student of physics argues from the notion of movement . . . he concludes that creation is impossible. In point of fact, the only legitimate conclusion of his argument is that creation is not a movement. . . . Whatever effort we may make, in consequence, we shall always *imagine* creation as if it were a change, a pictorial representation which makes it into something self-contradictory and impossible. In reality, creation is quite something else, something for which we have even no name . . ." (Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 45, a. 5 ad *resp.*, and a. 2 ad 2 and 3; *De Potentia*, III, a. 4 ad *resp.*; *Contra Gentiles*, II, cap. 17. Cf. also A.-D. Sertillanges, *Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy*, tr. by Godfrey Anstruther, O.P. [St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1931], chap. 4, "Creation.")

Created beings, composed of an act and a potency, are not only participated beings but also, on that very account, distinct beings. For, if the act of being is created and, simultaneously with it, the subject to receive that act is also created, then it follows that the act is received in a subject, exists in a created subject; that is to say, it subsists in its own subject and not in another; in other words, it is a distinct substance. An accident, on the other hand, has no subject of its own, it does not exist in itself, it exists in and by the subject of another entity. This is what is meant by the Scholastic axiom that creation results not in more *being* (*plus ens*) but in more *beings* (*plura entia*). This is the right solution of the problem of the one and the many.

Aurobindo misses all this because he does not probe enough into the abiding substratum of change. He jumps to the conclusion that it is a universal substance, a pure being, when in reality, as Aristotle has shown, it is a pure potency, an indeterminate subject, inasmuch as it is indifferent toward receiving one or the other form of being. It is the form that determines this potency and gives it its definite nature; it is an incomplete being, inasmuch as it is one of the constituent principles of the created being and not a being in itself.

Once Aurobindo had made this fundamental mistake others of a graver nature were a necessary sequel. We shall point out some of them in subsequent articles.

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

Postscripts and Addenda to De Principiis Naturae (Continued)

JOHN J. PAUSON

III

CONCLUSION

At least one example indicating a certain bifurcation in the initial diffusion of the archetype of *De Principiis* can be seen in the *versio prima* and *versio altera* of lines 15-17. With the exception of the fifteenth-century texts m, x, and z, which were apparently copied or compiled from more than one earlier manuscript, the sixty texts can be divided into two groups on the basis of this *versio prima* and *versio altera*. Those texts accepting the *versio altera* can be further classified by their variants of this same section, which seems to indicate that there was more uncertainty or confusion in the tradition of the *versio altera* than in the more uniform tradition of the *versio prima*.

Within the twenty-two texts containing the *versio altera*, certain similarities demonstrable from the variants of the section printed previously¹ immediately reduce the problem of establishing their genealogical relationships. As can be seen from these variants, M is almost identical with Q, N with X, C with G, and p with q. Also indicating close relationships are the constant groupings of hjk and tuv. In the case of such similarities there arises the question of which is the parent text, or whether the parent text is among any of those that have come down to us. Ordinarily this question is of secondary importance, especially if the texts are as similar as those of M and Q or C and G. If the tradition they manifest is important enough, further investigation might be necessary; otherwise it is sufficient to indicate their similarity.

Taking the obvious similarities of MQ, NX, CG, pq, hjk, and tuv, the problem of establishing a genealogy is numerically reduced from twenty-two texts to fourteen. The problem of the fourteen

¹THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, xxx (1952), 55-59.

texts can be reduced further by virtue of the principle of the obvious importance of the earlier manuscripts. When it is found, for instance, that the earlier manuscripts even of different traditions agree on certain variations, we are justified in rejecting later manuscripts that are not even in general agreement. Of less importance then among the twenty-two texts containing the *versio altera* are the fifteenth-century groupings and isolated texts: hjk, tuv, pq, r, i, and s. The remaining texts of major importance are CDFGIJMN PQTXY. M and Q throughout the whole text have only five or so minor differences. M was chosen because it is presumably the older text. Nothing could have been changed in the final text if Q had been chosen in its place. N and X, also almost identical, have certain apparently unique and original readings such as can be seen in line 22. Y, a later and somewhat incomplete text, is difficult to classify exactly. It seems to be in the general tradition of N and X, but not exclusively. X because of a few lacunae was rejected in favor of N.

As can be ascertained from the sample variants, CGJTD and at times I and F form a close group. As for the similarity of C and G, there is no evidence from their texts of *De Principiis* to contest the findings of Father O'Reilly² that C was copied from G, but his assertion³ that both C and G were not sufficiently represented by T, which was chosen as most representative of CGJTD, is based on a simple error. The passage⁴ supposedly quoted from G, although incorrectly reported in Perrier's text,⁵ is simply nonexistent in the Paris original of G. The entire *insinuation*,⁶ that the findings with regard to *De Hebdomadibus* call into question the findings concerning the texts of *De Principiis* that are not identical, is based upon the assumption that the method of compilation of various *opuscula codices* was entirely uniform with regard to each individual section or work. Until proven, this assumption seems gratuitous in the extreme. For instance D, which Father O'Reilly considers most important for *De Hebdomadibus*, contains numerous lacunae, such as can be seen in line 8, that prejudice its usefulness for any text of *De Principiis*.

J is a good text, but one written at least fifty years subsequent to T. As a result T, undoubtedly the oldest text of the group, was chosen over CG, D, and J to represent along with M and N one half of

²*Bulletin Thomiste*, VIII (1951), 151.

³*Ibid.*, 147.

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵J. Perrier, O. P., *Opuscula Omnia necnon Opera Minora* (Paris: Lethiel-leux, 1949), I, 3.

⁶See P. O'Reilly, *Bulletin Thomiste*, VIII (1951), 144 *et al.*

the entire tradition. F and I present special problems. F seems to be close within the tradition of CDGJT with direct evidence that it was corrected or possibly even compiled by recourse to a text or texts outside the immediate tradition. I presents even a greater reluctance for exact classification, and actually its variants were included in one of the original unprinted drafts of the text of *De Principiis*. At times its affinity to CDFJT is unquestionable. At other times its affinity to an almost opposite tradition is equally unquestionable. However, after careful study, the variants of I were rejected as being a patchwork of the original dual tradition rather than an earlier root of these same two traditions as Father Pelster assumes.⁷ Consequently, in the final draft of the text only M, T, and N were chosen to represent the first half of the general tradition.

Again using the principle that frequent variations in fifteenth-century texts which are entirely unique are sufficient to justify their rejection, we are left with ABEHKLOPRSUVWZ as representative of the second half of the general tradition. The sample variants show two marked groupings within this immediate tradition, namely, ABHOPRSWZ and EKLUV. Of this last group, K is almost identical to L, and U to V. E is representative and probably quite an early text, but it had to be rejected because of its numerous omissions. V, which was probably the parent manuscript of U and decidedly older than either K or L was consequently chosen as representative of EKLUV. Of the close unit AHOPRSWZ, P, the famous St. Victor manuscript, was chosen. Ample justification for this choice is given by G. F. Rossi in his recent series of articles in *Divus Thomas*.⁸ O, the obvious parent of at least H and R, was also included in one of the earlier unprinted drafts. However, it was finally rejected on the basis that it added nothing that was not already sufficiently represented by the six texts finally chosen. B, among these six finally chosen, although closely related to AHOPRSWZ, has important variations of its own. There is insufficient evidence to conclude whether B was very closely related to the archetype or whether it was a product of the then best available texts. Either explanation seems to justify its selection along with V and P as representative of the second half of the original bifurcation.

Among the fifteenth-century texts, the incunabula seem to be accepted as more important. At this point the question can be

⁷F. Pelster, S.J., *Gregorianum*, xxxii (1951), 157.

⁸G. F. Rossi, C.M., "Il Codice Latino 14546 con gli Opuscoli di San Tommaso," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza), xlv (1951), nos. 2, 3, and 4; xlv (1952), nos. 1 and 2.

raised whether their authors, some two hundred years after the death of St. Thomas, had access to any evidence that we do not possess today. As for the upper European incunabula, y, z, 2, and 3, the question seems to narrow itself down to the importance of y, the main source of z, 2, and 3; y can be easily identified within the tradition of V, and consequently is of no more importance than V. Of the Italian incunabula, 4, the parent of 5 and 6 (at least with regard to their texts of *De Principiis*) has to be taken on its own merits. It certainly contains traces of pq, NX, and B. The evidence, although by no means conclusive, seems to indicate another compilation of numerous Italian manuscripts. Regardless of the explanation of the peculiarities of 4, the text as a whole must be rejected as containing many variants with no counterpart in the two-hundred year tradition immediately preceding it. Even though it might be argued that this incunabulum makes good sense, at least in some places, it cannot be accepted as representative of the general tradition.

By way of conclusion, it can be admitted that individual texts among MTNBVP might have been substituted by others equally as representative of the whole tradition: it can be admitted that the exact and precise delineation of the genealogy might be called into question; but it still remains to be proven that an important segment of any well-founded tradition was omitted. We await the further evidence to be brought out by Dom. Basil Mattingly, O.S.B., in his projected work on this same *De Principiis*.

FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE MISSOURI STATE PHILOSOPHY ASSOCIATION

The fifth annual meeting of the Missouri State Philosophy Association was held Friday and Saturday, October 24 and 25, 1952, at Central College, Fayette, Missouri. The program consisted of three unrelated papers on Friday afternoon with discussions following each, the association dinner in the evening, and, on the following day, a symposium of three other papers centered about a common theme. On Friday afternoon Leonard Eslick of Saint Louis University spoke on "Plato's Dialectic of Non-Being"; William Weifeuback of the University of Kansas City on "The Place of Scientific Methods in Thought"; and Sidney Zink of the University of Missouri on "The Cognitive Effect of Art."

In his presidential address at the annual dinner, C. Eugene Hix, Jr., of Central College, posed the question, "Neo-Orthodoxy, a Trend or

a Passing Mood?" The discussion evoked by his appraisal of certain crucial points in the "crisis theologies" was long and lively, principally along religious and theological lines.

The theme of the symposium on Saturday morning was the philosophy of liberal education. The papers in which the contributions of three major fields to such a philosophy were presented led to quite general discussion. Arthur Berndtson of the University of Missouri spoke on the humanities; Leo Litwak of Washington University, on the sciences and scientific method; and W. Burnet Easton of Stephens College, on religion. Ensuing questions from those in attendance brought out pointedly the pessimistic attitude of the latter two positions toward natural human knowledge and philosophy. Professor Berndtson's examination of the aims of the humanities and Professor Eslick's paper of the preceding day on the object of predication in Plato's later dialogues were by all odds the most challenging and least adequately discussed of all the contributions to the meeting.

In the business meeting Friday evening W. Donald Oliver of the University of Missouri was elected president and Miss Caroline Nations was re-elected secretary-treasurer of the association. It was also unanimously voted to accept the invitation of Saint Louis University to hold the 1953 meeting in Saint Louis.

LINUS J. THRO, S.J.

Saint Louis University

CHRONICLE

THE MOUNTAIN-PLAINS PHILOSOPHICAL CONFERENCE held its annual meeting October 16-18, 1952, at the University of Nebraska (Lincoln). The general theme of the meetings was "symbols." The first session considered symbols in science; the second, symbols in art; the third, symbols in religion.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MONTREAL has inaugurated a program for English-speaking students leading to the master's degree. The program is based on the philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas. It consists of at least two years of course work and a thesis. Prospective students must have a bachelor's degree and must have taken some undergraduate philosophy courses. As presently announced, the faculty will consist of Professors Raymond Klibansky, Paul Lacoste, Andrew G. O'Connor, John J. Pauson, and the Reverend Albert-M. Landry, O.P. Further particulars may be obtained from Dr. A. G. O'Connor, 1062 Bernard Ave., W (Apt. 25), Outremont, Quebec.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE DOCTRINE OF BEING IN THE ARISTOTELIAN *Metaphysics*: A STUDY IN THE GREEK BACKGROUND OF MEDIAEVAL THOUGHT. By Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951. Pp. xi + 461. \$5.00.

Some years ago Professor Gilson in a celebrated lecture developed the thesis that for anyone who would engage in the quest for wisdom and who would thus wish to become a philosopher himself, the proper course would be to put himself under the guidance of a master; and lacking a genuine master in philosophy in the present, the would-be philosopher would do well to seek such a master in the past. However, a discipleship under a master who is no longer living but dead, Professor Gilson pointed out, would necessarily mean engaging

in straight historical work. True enough, history is not here your goal. What you ultimately want to know is truth, but since your immediate problem is to know if what [your master] says is true, what you must first know is what [your master] actually says.¹

Such an account of a philosophical discipleship via history fittingly characterizes, it seems to me, this remarkable work of Father Owens on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Also it is equally fitting and significant that this same work should have emanated from the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto and should be prefaced by Professor Gilson himself.

Needless to say, working under these auspices, Father Owens is hardly one to find in Aristotle his only or his ultimate master in philosophy. Rather his concern is to become as intimately acquainted as he can with that master who was, in the eyes of nearly all the medieval thinkers, simply "the Philosopher." For through such a disciple's acquaintance with the master, Father Owens has hoped to contribute to the discharge of what Gilson in his preface has designated as "one of the present tasks of history"—"to give back to Aristotle what is Aristotle's, and, by the same token, to achieve a clear awareness of what has been the contribution of the middle ages to the development of Western philosophy" (p. vi).

¹*History of Philosophy and Philosophical Education* (the "Aquinas Lecture," 1947; Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1948), p. 29.

Indeed, if one wishes to gauge in a rough and preliminary way the novel impact of Father Owens's study, let one but ask oneself just what it would mean for one in this present day and age to decide to put oneself in Aristotle's hands as one's master in philosophy. Certainly, it would not mean doing quite the sort of thing the Rosses, the Jaegers, the Chernisses, *et al.*, have done. For these men would scarcely consider that it was they who had put themselves in Aristotle's hands, so much as it was Aristotle who had put himself in theirs. Moreover, we are all familiar with the results. For when a philologist or classical scholar considers that his objective is merely history and not philosophy—merely what Aristotle says and not at all whether what he says is true—it almost invariably turns out that what Aristotle is made to say are things that in philosophy are hopelessly jumbled and often inconsistent, and frequently just don't make good sense.

With Father Owens, however, the results are different. True, he yields nothing in erudition to the classical scholars. Witness his nearly a hundred and fifty pages of tightly-packed and extremely rich notes, references, and bibliography. It is as if his desire to understand and do full justice to his master required that he read everything that people were saying about the master, in order that all such comments and criticisms might be properly assessed and corrected. At the same time—and this is the distinctive thing about his achievement—while taking full and exact cognizance of all the modern research in Aristotle, he shows that in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle was really talking sense philosophically: the teaching is unified and consistent and, making due allowances for the fact that the writings are in the nature of school *logoi*, even the text and style are, if not clear, at least intelligible to the patient and discerning student determined to understand the master's teaching precisely as philosophy.

As to what this Aristotelian teaching is, Father Owens begins his book with a presentation of what has currently come to be thought of as a radical ambiguity in Aristotle's account of the subject matter of metaphysics. On the one hand, he seems to say that metaphysics studies *ens commune*, being qua being, or being in general; on the other hand, and just as frequently, he seems to say that the proper concern of metaphysics is with a very special kind of being—*ens perfectissimum*, or the divine being. After giving a most illuminating account of the history of this supposed ambiguity, or even contradiction, from ancient times right down to the present, Father Owens then plunges forthwith into a detailed study of the *Metaphysics*, book by book, showing that once one looks at metaphysics in the way that

Aristotle himself did, this supposed ambiguity in subject matter turns out to be a pseudoproblem.

Actually, Father Owens insists, Aristotle—like Parmenides and Plato before him—tended to assume that true being was simply the enduring, the unchanging, the permanent. Accordingly, in the introductory discussion of the nature of wisdom in Book Alpha, it is the notion of “form” or *eidos* that at once assumes the dominant role. It is knowledge of the form which makes “universal” knowledge possible, and universal knowledge is linked with knowledge “through cause.” Moreover, the science that is most universal is said to be the science that considers the first principles and causes. And of the four causes, Father Owens insists, all of them, even the material cause, eventually come to be reduced to the causality of form.

At the same time, the Aristotelian “way” or method of procedure toward the unchanging being of form is not the Platonic way. For Aristotle does not start from forms as separate and as so many “ones-over-many.” Instead, he starts from sensible things; and he not only locates the form as “a permanent principle *within* sensible things,” but also “establishes this principle as most intimate to these things and as the foundation of their Being—as their Entity or ‘Beingness’” (p. 98). Now, interestingly enough, it is this very word “entity” which Father Owens suggests as perhaps the most felicitous translation of the vexatious Aristotelian term *ousia*. Hence, it is in terms of the notion of the entity or *ousia* of things that the initial coalescing of form-cause-universal in Book Alpha is to be understood.

Nevertheless, throughout both the earlier and the central books of the *Metaphysics* there are repeated hints and suggestions to the effect that form, as constituting the very core of “beingness” or entity or *ousia* in sensible things, is still not entity or *ousia* in the first and most proper sense. Such entity must needs be located in forms that are wholly separate from matter—and separate not merely “in intelligible content” (*logo*), but separate without qualification. In short, it is in the treatment of separate entity in Books Mu, Nu, and Lambda that the *Metaphysics* as a treatise and the science of being qua being as a science culminate.

But no sooner is the structure and character of the *Metaphysics* so represented than the reader may immediately wonder, But what about Jaeger? And more generally, the question presents itself as to whether and how Father Owens can defend his interpretation in the light of so much modern research into the chronology of, and the consequent assessment of, the relative importance of the various parts of the

Metaphysics. Unhappily, this is a field of scholarship in which the present reviewer possesses no competence. Suffice it to say, however, that it is precisely in this field that, according to Gilson, possibly "the greatest merit" of Father Owens's work lies.

The principle laid down by Jaeger that the content of Aristotle's doctrine should be examined in close union with its form of expression is indisputably correct. . . . But the notion of literary form is not a simple one. In a philosophical work, even the literary form of expression should be interpreted in function of the philosophical needs which it is supposed to answer.

Now it is the awareness of this fact that has provided Father Owens with "the idea of a new methodological approach to the text of Aristotle and his work owes to this method the better part of its originality" (pp. vi-vii).

But doubts in regard to philosophical and textual matters are not the only ones which this very brief sketch of Father Owens's interpretation of Aristotle may give rise to. In addition, any number of more strictly philosophical doubts may suggest themselves also. Accordingly, in evidence of the subtlety and philosophical acumen with which Father Owens works out the doctrines of his master, it might be well to single out just a few such doubts as must surely have occurred to readers and then to indicate briefly in each case how the author has both anticipated and dealt with such possible misgivings.

In the first place, what of that issue already mentioned of the supposed ambiguity of Aristotelian metaphysics? From the account given it would hardly seem that Father Owens had made it clear whether the subject matter of metaphysics was being as being or being as divine. Nevertheless, this issue is most skillfully disposed of by pointing out that one after another of Aristotle's key terms—being, entity, cause, and so on—are in the nature of what Father Owens calls "*proshen* equivocals." That is to say, such unity of meaning as they have is a unity in virtue of (though Father Owens never uses the term) an analogy of attribution. Thus, the primary instance of being, cause, and *ousia* is to be found in separate entity; and only derivatively are they in sensible things. Likewise, in sensible things themselves being is properly located in one definite category—namely, substance or *ousia*—and from this is derived to the affections or accidents. Or again, with respect to the substrate, one may correctly say that entity or *ousia* is the form, the matter, or the composite. And yet "form is the *prior* instance in regard to the other two. . . . As Entity is

prior to accidents, so within Entity itself form is prior to matter and composite" (pp. 199-200).

In consequence, the science of being qua being is quite properly a universal science. And yet, its universality is not based on anything like a "general concept" or "abstract universal" (p. 165). Indeed, "Being *qua* Being is clearly regarded as not something abstract" (p. 176). Rather it is a "definite nature," whose primary instance is in the highest being and which is thence derived to all other beings in the manner of a *pros hen* equivocal. And if one wishes to know how "this definite nature can be universal in regard to all things," the answer is that it is in virtue of its "priority" (p. 176).

And now for a second possible doubt or query. If Aristotle tends to equate Entity or *ousia* with form, and if form is located, at least derivatively, in sensible things, what about the issue of realism and nominalism? Father Owens's way of meeting this issue is most suggestive, although many will no doubt suspect that in this instance at least he is reading back into his Greek master lessons learned from the Scholastics. Briefly, his proposal is that form for Aristotle is neither singular nor universal. It "cannot be singular because it is knowable and definable. . . . It cannot be universal because it is Entity" (that is, substance or *ousia*). Rather form is "the cause of Being and the foundation of universality." Accordingly,

the singular and the universal are to be explained in terms of form, and not vice-versa. All three are given as facts, with form prior in knowability. If the problem is posed in two terms only, singularity and universality, it becomes utterly insoluble. If the premises are "only the singular exists, only the universal is known," how can the Aristotelian notion of *eidos*, which is both physical form and logical species, ever be grasped? It will have to be fixed as either singular or universal, or else merely catalogued as a hopeless union of the two contradictory alternatives. The form must be kept as prior to and act of both composite Entity and logical universal. The two latter have to be explained in terms of form (pp. 242-44, *passim*).

Finally, let us mention still another illuminating line of answer which Father Owens gives to a possible source of doubt. For one might well ask whether in his effort to show that Aristotle equates being and entity with form, Father Owens has not made it difficult if not impossible to draw any distinction between Aristotelian form and Platonic Form. To this query, however, a decisive answer is given. While it is true that the Aristotelian form retains many of

the characteristics of the Platonic Form, still, as we have already noted, it

is reached by an analysis of sensible change. It is not a "one-over-many", which originates in the realm of logic and definitions. It stems consequently from a source different from the Platonic Form. It is attained by a different "way".

But even more significantly,

the Platonic form as Aristotle sees it, is essentially passive, something that *is known*. The Aristotelian form is essentially something that *acts*, and *consequently* is able to be known and impart knowability to the composite sensible thing. What is fundamental for Plato appears as a derived characteristic in the Aristotelian approach.

But there is still more. For "in their highest instances form and knowledge turn out to be identical." Indeed, "the Aristotelian separate forms are [active and actual] knowings." "In comparison the Platonic forms are potential. They are knowables."

All this is meant in saying that the Aristotelian form is *act*. While the Platonic Form is something as it were flat and essentially a knowable, the Aristotelian is vital and in comparison three-dimensional, and is in its deepest sense a "knowing" rather than a knowable (pp. 291-92, *passim*).

To be sure, in thus noting the advance which Aristotle made over Plato in recognizing the centrality to metaphysics of the notion of act, Father Owens is nonetheless careful to point out that Aristotle's recognition never goes so far as to take in anything like the act of existing. Here a line must be drawn. And in drawing it, Father Owens repeatedly seeks to confirm a thesis already made familiar by Professor Gilson that in giving back to Aristotle what is Aristotle's there is one thing which is most emphatically not a proper object of return—the very act itself of existing.

HENRY VEATCH

Indiana University

METHOD IN METAPHYSICS. The "Aquinas Lecture," 1950. By Robert J. Henle, S.J. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 73.

The problem this Aquinas lecturer deals with is the "experiential moment of metaphysics." The importance of this problem is primary for a metaphysics that pretends to be, as Thomistic metaphysics does, an independent science of the real rather than some meta-science or meta-something, twice removed from reality. Father Henle makes

an excellent case for inductive insight as the origin of all knowledge. First he takes the case of conceptual knowledge, then of essential judgment; finally, he finds that metaphysics, too, has its inductive moment in the direct existential judgment, where metaphysics has immediate and privileged contact with reality as existing.

Much of the lecture is taken up with an analysis of knowledge in general. This might be considered a wrong emphasis in an essay entitled "Method in Metaphysics." Yet I think there was little else Father Henle could do. It is no easy task to be a realist in metaphysics, mainly because it is no easy task to be a realist about any knowledge. And if you think, as Father Henle does, that the common analyses of knowledge obscure its contact with reality, you will have to clear up the general question before you can say your say about metaphysics.

Take the metaphysical analysis of knowledge that speaks of knowledge as *esse intentionale*. In one sense this analysis is profoundly realistic, yet it gives an account of knowledge as being, not of knowledge as uniquely knowledge. Moreover, it supposes, rather than makes clear, the direct contact that knowledge has with reality. The causal explanation of knowledge (using the image, the agent and possible intellect, and the concept) might seem to be just the one to show contact with reality. But emphasis here on the materiality of sense and image as opposed to the immateriality of intellect and concept tend to make a clear break in the process of knowing. Moreover, this explanation seems to limit contact of the intellect with the image (and ultimately with the thing) to the one fine point where abstraction takes place. From there on out, the content is on its own in the intelligible world, ready to be analyzed or put into essential propositions. Metaphysics, on this showing, would be the science that analyzes the concept of being and then lays down noncontradiction, sufficient reason, causality, and so on, as necessarily valid principles *because* of an analysis of concepts rather than of things. A metaphysics, so constituted, ought to be suspect among realists, if for no other reason than that it includes the darling of Leibniz, the principle of sufficient reason.

Looking for a more realistic approach to knowledge, Father Henle turns for his data to our direct perception of the knowing process. He finds that the mind is in conscious contact with the intelligibility (here the rectangularity) of an existing rectangular card throughout the sensing, imagining, beginning intellection, and complete intellectualization of the definition. From the side of the object, the rectangu-

larity of the existing card is present in each phase of the knowing process. The same conscious contact with existing reality is evidenced when the card is considered as a whole with parts that can be designated. For the mind can see *in the card* the *de jure* necessity of the relation of whole to part. By considering the same existing card the mind can, by a reflection that explicates what it saw in the card (and not what it sees in concepts), purify this intelligible relationship to the principle of continuous quantity.

This account of the immediately perceivable character of knowing as inductive insight into sense data shows the mistake of opposing intellectual knowledge as universal and necessary to things as singular and contingent. Knowing and the known have only one proper opposition; that is, between intellectually grasped intelligibility and the intelligible thing (p. 34). Universality and necessity attach to some knowledge because the intelligibility of the thing warrants that way of being known, and not because knowledge demands universality or necessity.

Formal knowledge of the structure of things is not the only knowledge we experience. Beyond this is the knowledge of the existence of things, expressed in the concrete existential judgments. These judgments, too, are expressions of the intelligibility of things, but in an order that is not formal or essential. The knowledge-cause of such judgments cannot be the concepts, for concepts do not include actual existence. The only place such actual existence can be found is in things; the mind must therefore return to the phantasm where it is in touch with things. Here it reads, on a deeper plane, the existence of the thing and expresses this in an existential judgment. This moment is the "experiential moment of existential metaphysics." Such direct judgments are not yet up to the level of philosophical science. But the intelligibilities, which can become metaphysical, are already in the concrete judgment, the phantasm, the thing. All that is needed to bring such intelligibility to a scientific status is a purifying reflection upon what has been seen in the phantasm. This reflection does not add anything; by a continuous process it focuses contemplation upon the reality with which the judgment is in contact and then orders these intelligibilities in their purity. For example, every concrete existential judgment contains the necessary intelligibility that can, on reflection, be seen as the first principle of the act of existing; that is, the principle of contradiction.

Thus metaphysics is a real science. It feeds and deepens by a continual return to the reality in concrete experience. It is an inde-

pendent science, because it alone raises the act of existing to its pure intelligibility. Its proper procedure is induction through insight.

Realistic metaphysicians owe Father Henle a debt of gratitude for making clear this privileged experiential moment of a truly existential metaphysics. They may, however, wonder why a lecture on this point, important as it is, should be entitled "Method in Metaphysics." All knowledge is ontological in that it reflects its origin in being. But metaphysics is a special kind of knowledge because it resolves its concepts and judgments in being as being. Method in metaphysics would then deal with the transcendental character of metaphysical judgments. Father Henle, I presume, would not deny this. But he could ask, What grounds this transcendentality of metaphysical judgments? Certainly not the fact that knowledge is ontological, since all knowledge is not transcendental; nor the fact that mind "abstracts" in some special way, though it does. What grounds judgments that are transcendental will be that in reality which demands such judgments, namely the *esse*. Where the mind discovers this intelligibility of *esse* may not be the whole story of what goes on in metaphysics; but it is part of that story, and the most important part too.

FRANCIS C. WADE, S.J.

Marquette University

PHILOSOPHIE DER ENDLICHKEIT ALS SPIEGEL DER GEGENWART.

By Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen. Meisenheim am Glan:

Westkulturverlag Anton Hain, 1951. Pp. 490.

The over-all picture of modern philosophy reveals no school or direction of thought that explicitly makes a philosophy of finiteness its aim and goal. What Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen has done in this excellent book has been to capture a mood, a climate of thought, permeating the philosophies that affect our times. The mood or climate of thought as it appears in the various philosophical trends he calls "philosophies of finiteness." And these "philosophies of finiteness" are "the mirror of the present"; that is, they give us an insight toward the understanding of our own intellectual and historical groping for the truth. It may be banal to say that an understanding of the philosophies of an age is a necessary condition for understanding the age itself, but the author has done more than just that. He has penetrated the very marrow of contemporary thought, drawn out from its consciousness of mortality (*Vergänglichkeitsbewusstsein*) the progressive realization of a transcendent, metaphysical, religious implication immersed in it.

The author takes a double approach to the problem of finiteness in modern thought: the one through literature, the other through philosophy. The artist's contemplative approach to reality and the thinker's analytical approach are both inextricably involved in the consideration of the spirit of any particular time (*Zeitgeist*). In the present instance, the author's exposition of the two approaches to the one reality, leading down from Reiner Maria Rilke on the one hand and from Heidegger on the other, is nothing short of masterful. Hölderlin, Novalis, Goethe, Valéry, and Camus meet with and mingle with Jaspers, Marcel, Sartre, Nietzsche, and Hegel without confusion. The very mass of material contained in the table of contents and in the index would alone extend beyond the limits of a review. It is to the author's great credit that he has ordered and arranged a vast variety of materials flawlessly.

Perhaps the most fascinating chapter deals with the relationship between the *mystique* of death (*Todesmystik*) and the concept of finiteness. This is the central chapter in the book. To it the previous discussion of philosophies intrinsically linked to time, of everything that renounces transcendent thinking, the evasion of existence and the affirmation of finitude, and the despair or the acceptance of that condition all lead patently and patiently. From it, there follow the transcendental implications of thinking on being, of subjectivity in the existential sense, and, finally, the manifest insufficiency of merely accepting or giving in to finiteness.

The death-*mystique* idea is central not only to the book, but also to the times. It is the logical flowering of our psychological and philosophical past. Nietzsche inaugurated the *mystique* of the superman when he displaced God in favor of the blond giant. With the help of Hegel and Feuerbach, Marx replaced the *mystique* of the superman with that of the superstate when he allowed the machinery of dialectic materialism to swallow up the blond giant and lose him in the masses. Both superman and superstate were rejected by existentialism when it looked upon the scene and was nauseated. The *mystique* of the superman and the *mystique* of the superstate were now replaced by the *mystique* of the absurd.

Part of this *mystique* of the absurd is the death-*mystique*—that is, if one does not choose to identify them, as they may be identified without overly straining the distinctions. It embraces, by and large, the philosophies of pure finiteness that consider man as standing on the brink of nothingness, utterly limited and hemmed in by *this* existence (materialism, nihilism, even existentialism); the deperson-

alizing (*entpersönlichende*) system of naturalism or the monism of a *Lebensphilosophie*; the positivism (nineteenth-century or Enlightenment or Renaissance) which would avert the problem of death by substituting an affirmation of the world (*Weltbejahung*) for it; the limitation to a pacifying idealization of death such as can be found in idealism or pantheism or even romanticism. It embraces the troubled tossing of a Rilke between the extremes of immortality and complete annihilation, as well as the perspectives of hope as derived from Kierkegaard or Jaspers.

Heidegger's famous "Sein zum Tode" crystallized the *mystique* of death which Sartre carried out to its last futile conclusions. The notion of death enters into the very definition of man's being by this notion of Heidegger's. Consequently, it is also the foundation of man's existence (*Dasein*) in history—a notion that Jolivet has translated as a *vivre pour mourir* concept and that Sartre developed to the point of the negative absurdity of existence. It is the foundation for Camus's statement, "In the world of absurdity, the value of an action or a life is measured by its unfruitfulness." It is, finally, the *mystique* to which Marcel has given the answer that "it can be conceived either as a perverse but fascinating game, or at a deeper level and more truly, as the end of a process of auto-destruction which is going on within a doomed society, within a humanity which has broken, or thinks it has broken, its ontological moorings."

Ironically enough, it is from these very theses of despair, from the philosophies of catastrophe, that the new hour of the spirit is rising. The very inadequacy of the *mystiques* that refuse to accept man in what might be called his natural state clamors for a solution in the transcendent. To put man in the limiting situation (*Grenzsituation*) of pure matter has not only proved unsatisfactory for comprehending him, but has itself produced the situation which demands a further exploration of his immaterial potentialities. The attempt to give life meaning through the medium of meaninglessness has tripped on the stumbling block of its own contradiction. In fact, it has brought forth the new situation where matter and spirit, visible and invisible, the contraries of time and transcendence, of change and the absolute, of finite and infinite, are not necessarily in conflict, are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but by their unity in analogy can be mutually creative.

This book cannot be recommended too highly. Only the reading of it could possibly do it the justice that it deserves.

VICTOR R. YANITELLI, S.J.

Fordham University

Tributes to Avicenna

Recently the name of Avicenna has been appearing in philosophical news notes. (Cf. *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, XXIX [May, 1952], 312.) In several countries philosophers have been celebrating the millennial anniversary of Avicenna's birth. (Avicenna was born in the year 370 of the hegira, and the year 1951-52 of the Christian era corresponds to the year 1370 of the hegira.) To mark the occasion, the Arab League sponsored a congress at Baghdad; the government of Iran sponsored a second congress at Teheran and has undertaken the publication of the Persian texts of Avicenna; and the Department of Public Instruction in Egypt has planned to publish a critical edition of the Arabic text of the *Shifā'*.

Among the many current Avicenna memorial writings, we shall note some of those that are at once interesting and rather easily obtainable. The *Revue Thomiste*, for example, devoted an issue to Avicenna in 1951 (Vol. LI, No. 2). In one of its articles, "La tradition manuscrite orientale de l'oeuvre d'Avicenne," (pp. 407-40) Father Anawati, O.P., tells of a project of the Arab League on which he himself did a great amount of work. As a preliminary step towards the task of eventually publishing a critical edition of the Arabic works of Avicenna, it was necessary to prepare a complete catalogue of Avicennian manuscripts. Father Anawati was a member of the cultural mission sent by the Arab League to the libraries of Istanbul to establish a bibliography which could serve as a working tool for scholars. The results of his research appeared originally in Arabic under the title, *Mu'allafāt Ibn Sīnā* (Cairo, 1950). In the *Revue Thomiste* article, Father Anawati, after describing the procedure of his project and the reasons for adopting a classification by subject matter, presents in French a summary of his valuable bibliography of Avicenna's works.

Another fine contribution to Avicenna studies in this issue is the French translation by Georges Vajda of Avicenna's notes on *The Theology of Aristotle* (pp. 346-406). Since this pseudo-Aristotelian work was in fact a compilation from the *Enneads* of Plotinus, Avicenna's notes or glosses on it may be called his commentary on Plotinus. They are important, too, in explaining the emergence from his writings of a Neoplatonized Aristotle. Vajda's translation is introduced by Louis Gardet. In the article, "En l'honneur du millénaire d'Avicenne," (pp. 333-45) M. Gardet points out three of the dominant themes of the notes or glosses on *The Theology of Aristotle*: (1) the notion of being; (2) the world of separate intel-

ligences and celestial souls; and (3) the human soul and intellect in their relations with the higher world. He shows that in the discussion of each of these themes the glosses reveal no sudden departure from the conclusions Avicenna had reached in earlier works, but rather indicate a progressive development of his thought. This conclusion has a special significance in relation to the much-debated question of Avicenna's "Oriental Philosophy."

Avicenna had planned to write a work on Oriental philosophy or Oriental wisdom in which he would give us his own thought; he suggests that he had hidden himself in his other works but would explain his true system in this treatise. So far as we know, he never completed the entire work. Only its preface and a part of the logical section have come down to us. The problem, therefore, for students of Avicenna is this: Do we really know what Avicenna himself held? Is it possible to get any idea of his "true system" from his extant works? What would have been the content of his "Oriental Philosophy"? Would it have shown a radical change from the views usually attributed to him? Much ink has flowed in discussions of these questions.

They are the subject of a long introduction to a recent French translation of Avicenna's *Ishārāt* by A.-M. Goichon. Mlle Goichon draws her inferences from her work on this text. Noting that the *Ishārāt* was written towards the end of Avicenna's life, she believes it should reveal traces of any new convictions which he may have reached. It should at least give a hint of the direction of any philosophical evolution which Avicenna was experiencing in the latter part of his life. She finds that Avicenna brings certain modifications to the theories of his Greek predecessors and that these modifications are in favor of a rationalistic and scientific thought. She believes that his "Oriental Philosophy" would have revealed a trend similar to that of our Renaissance. While holding that the Greek methods of thought remain fundamental, he would very likely have shown that the scientific advance of the Persians (e.g., the scientific school of Jundī-Shāpūr) had opened new ways to the mind. Gardet, however, while not denying Avicenna's interest in experimental science, thinks that Mlle Goichon tends too easily to identify experimental research and "rationalism." Without attempting to guess the missing content of the "Oriental Philosophy," Gardet does judge it probable that Avicenna intended in that work to add corrections and precisions to his original line of thought. On the basis of presently available sources, Gardet thinks it reasonable to conclude that Avicenna experienced no radical change in the direction of his thought but came

to have a clearer and more deliberate grasp of his own philosophical position.

The discussion of the problem of the "Oriental Philosophy" is only one part of the content of the works by Gardet and Goichon. Gardet's book, *La pensée religieuse d'Avicenne* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951; pp. 235), seeks primarily to discover the sense in which Avicenna's philosophy can be called a Mohammedan philosophy. After studying Avicenna's notions of philosophy, his teaching on the relations of necessary and possible being, on God's knowledge of the singular, on the resurrection of the body, prophecy, and mysticism, Gardet concludes that Avicenna's thought is Mohammedan in the sense that it would not have been what it is without Islam. Its very originality consists in its manifestation both of the influence of the Koran and of the tradition of Greek philosophy, but this does not mean that Avicenna was an apologist for Islam. M. Gardet brings out very well the remarkable continuity and coherence of the Avicennian system where even mysticism and prophecy are fitted easily into a philosophical framework.

A.-M. Goichon's book, *Ibn Sīnā: Livres des directives et remarques* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951; pp. 552), was published as a volume in the "Arabic Series" of the *UNESCO Collection of Representative Works*. It consists of an annotated French translation of the work usually referred to as the *Ishārāt*. In addition to discussing the relation of this work to the problem of the "Oriental Philosophy," Mlle Goichon considers in her introduction the nature of the *Ishārāt* itself. It is not so much a single treatise, she says, as a collection of notes on controversial points. Although there is a division into chapters and a relation of the content of each chapter to a central theme, the organization within each chapter is often rather weak. The plan which Avicenna announces in his prologue consists in beginning with the science of logic and passing from there to the science of nature and metaphysics, but the range of topics touched upon is wider than the plan might suggest. Problems of the human soul and its relations with celestial souls, creation, knowledge, beatitude, and prodigies or marvelous actions are also discussed. The editor includes full notes which give references to parallel passages in other works by Avicenna and, where possible, to similar passages in Aristotle or Plotinus so that the reader can easily judge the similarities and differences between the thought of Avicenna and that of his predecessors.

Another work by Goichon also appeared in 1951, a second edition of the "Forlong Lectures" which were given in March, 1940, at the School of African and Oriental Studies of the University of London.

This edition of *La philosophie d'Avicenne et son influence en Europe médiévale* (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1951; pp. xxi + 137) differs from the first by the inclusion of a new preface which mentions works on Arabic thought that have appeared since 1940 and by the reprinting of an article (from *Afrique française* [October, 1938]) in which Mlle Goichon has called for a greater degree of cultural co-operation between Moslems and philosophers of the Western world. The main part of the book, which reproduces the content of the first edition, is divided into three parts: a statement of the great theses of Avicenna's philosophy, a discussion of the difficulties the Arabs had in making their concrete vocabulary a vehicle for Greek philosophical ideas, and a sketch of the influence of Avicennian philosophy on medieval Europe. This third section, unlike the other two, is based not so much on the author's own study of primary sources as on the work of such writers as Roland-Gosselin, R. de Vaux, Rohmer, and Gilson.

One more Avicenna memorial work might be mentioned: *Avicenna on Theology*, by A. J. Arberry (London: John Murray, 1951; pp. 82). This small book is a volume in the "Wisdom of the East Series," which seeks to be an ambassador of good-will and understanding between East and West. It consists mainly of translations from the Arabic of passages in Avicenna's works on the nature of God, predestination, prophecy, prayer, the after-life, and the soul. The titles of the works from which the excerpts are taken are mentioned, but there is no indication of the chapter and section of the work referred to or of the edition used by the translator. These omissions lessen the value of the work for the scholar. In an introduction the translator gives a brief biographical and political background for the study of Avicenna but rather gratuitously comments that in rejecting the doctrine of the resurrection of the body Avicenna was "gloriously heretical" (p. 6). One of the most interesting features of the book is the inclusion of Avicenna's autobiography, together with the biography by his disciple, al-Jūzjānī. But here again one would have wished to see a more detailed reference to the translator's source material.

These works which have been published to honor Avicenna can—some to a greater and some to a lesser degree—be of help to the historian of Western philosophy. They can give him a better understanding of a Moslem whose thought pervaded the Christian Middle Ages.

BEATRICE H. ZEDLER

Marquette University

THEOLOGY AND EDUCATION. By Thomas C. Donlan, O.P.
 Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown, 1952. Pp. viii + 184. \$3.00.

This book is reviewed here, not because it is directly philosophical, but because, by failing to make certain distinctions, it seems to exclude philosophy. The author maintains that it is proper to theology to order the curriculum (pp. 8-9, 126-27), yet he also admits that "without philosophy there could be no real intellectual integration of the curricula of the schools" (p. 127). The difficulty is that there are several types of unity or order in education, and to let one destroy the others is to destroy them all. There is the unity of end or purpose, and this unity is, for a Catholic, properly conferred by theology. There is the unity of the subject to be educated, which is conferred by the humanistic disciplines (literature and the arts); there is thirdly the intrinsic ordering of all the parts of education in relation to each other (even including "theology"), and this unity is properly established by philosophy.

There is an even more important point concerning the sort of theology that is to be taught in school. The author proposes that "theology" be taught before philosophy (pp. 117-19) and maintains that this proposal is in harmony with the intention of St. Thomas's *Summa Theologiae* (pp. 111-13, 119, 121-25, 128-29). This reviewer finds it impossible to understand how the traditional term *theology* can meaningfully be applied to a presentation of the faith that does not make use of philosophy. Granted that *religion* is a vague term for college courses in the content of the faith, it seems that calling them "theology courses" will engender in the students the illusion that they are theologians and will also degrade theology itself. The cure is worse than the present trouble. On the other hand, if the author really means that there can be a rational discipline concerned with the content of faith, but without philosophy, it seems to the reviewer that the judgment of Dom Iltyd Trethowan is applicable: ". . . the theologian who says 'I'm a theologian and not a philosopher' is talking nonsense" (*Certainty: Philosophical and Theological* [Westminster: Dacre Press, 1948], p. 65). Finally, the very idea that St. Thomas's *Summa*, "for beginners," can be used without philosophy seems to be a complete misunderstanding of St. Thomas's purpose. He wrote the *Summa* for beginners—in theology. But they had already completed a course in philosophy, based on the works of Aristotle as modified by the Commentaries of St. Thomas. It *might* be possible to teach philosophy and theology together, but such a method seems to be confusing and therefore highly impractical. But what possible under-

standing can a student or a reader derive of the theology of the *Summa* without its philosophy? He can learn to talk like a theologian, it is true, and he could easily come to the completely disastrous conclusion that theology is only words. A pure "theology without philosophy" has in the past produced either a purely positive theology or sheer nominalism. It is of course possible to construct a "humanistic theology"; but such a theology will not claim to be a science; it will not claim to contain the essential theology of the *Summa*. Such a theology is not in question here, for the author explicitly rejects theology based on rhetoric. What he is speaking of is Scholastic or speculative theology without philosophy. The author's zeal and devotion are not being criticized; indeed, they are clearly recognizable and ought to be honored. But his proposal ought to be considered in the light of reason and of the sombre lessons of history.

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.

Saint Louis University

ESSAI SUR LE PROBLÈME ET LES CONDITIONS DE LA SINCÉRITÉ. By Régis Jolivet. Paris: Vitte, 1950. Pp. 200.

The problem of sincerity is fundamentally a problem of communication, first of all with one's self and then with others. In fact, sincerity with one's self, the grasping of one's self *à l'état pur*, without foreign admixture, addition, or diminution, stands as the necessary condition for achieving sincerity with others. Communication with one's self necessarily implies a value judgment; and it is here, right within the bosom of one's own interiority, that the principal problem of sincerity rests.

Sincerity supposes an organization of one's intimate being, the imposing of some general conceptual pattern upon one's own subjectivity in order to make it intelligible. For example, the difficulty found in trying to "fix" the elusive character of an André Gide derives precisely from the fact that Gide's *effort extraordinaire* consisted uniquely in keeping his subjectivity from falling into any preconceived pattern. Ironically, this turned out to be a pattern to avoid patterns. It is the basis of his sincere "insincerities."

Every reflex act of the mind, every *retour sur soi*, implies some fatal kind of intellectual composition, some pose taken as for a photograph, which *ipso facto* puts at a distance the possibility of "pure" sincerity. For pure sincerity, or total sincerity, does not know itself, does not "see" itself, and consequently seems to be beyond the reach of reflection.

Pascal made much of the moral pressures exerted upon the subjective ego by prejudice, imagination, and illusion, so that a man can be deceived even in his own intentions. Even Freud capitalized upon the truth that there exists in man a capacity for subjective simulation which frequently leads him to dupe himself. Psychologically speaking, knowledge itself makes sincerity difficult because it intervenes to point out what is authentic and what is false in the subjectivity—it takes upon itself the value-judgment that should be the primitive implication of all sincerity. “Like a perfume dissipated in the open air, subjectivity and sincerity evaporate when displayed in public as an object or spectacle.” Sincerity can never be proved.

Régis Jolivet thus builds up the problem of sincerity in order to make more potent his conclusions that sincerity must be sought by sentiment rather than by discursive reflection; it must be experienced rather than analyzed. The sentiment of sincerity can be found in simplicity and in the unity of the testimony one bears to oneself in all his acts and works. Simplicity unifying my life, felt rather than rationally deduced, eliminates duplicity and lends transparency to my being. Therefore, sincerity can only be *lived*.

Even from this altogether simplified version of Jolivet's approach to the problem, the reader can derive a fair idea of the painstaking thoroughness with which the author moves in upon his problem. From a study of consciousness he goes on to deal with intuition, consciousness as related to feeling, to concepts, and to transcendence. One of his most illuminating chapters treats of the interior dynamism of the ego. Here he gives a lucid summary of the theories of William James and Henri Bergson and Maurice Merleau-Ponty on the piecemeal quality of conscious experience and the problem of the unification of these temporal transitions that occur within the subjective ego.

Jolivet attacks the existential point of view on temporality and historicity as being the successive multiplicity of *abstract* time. Real time, on the other hand, has a triple dimension—a present, which is the unstable coincidence of being and of consciousness, together with a future which simultaneously announces itself and begins to actualize, and a past which commences to reveal the form it takes. Time in the real sense (*le temps originaire*) is a sort of explicitation of my own subjectivity; in the words of St. Augustine, *in te, anime meus, tempora metior*.

The communication with others offers the special problem of subjectivity reaching out to subjectivity. By what mediation can this be accomplished? Jolivet answers, by the same means, fundamentally,

of sentiment and experience. In the case of communication with others, however, sentiment will be conveyed by suggestion rather than by confiding reflective judgments; and experience will be manifested by symbols rather than by analysis. Again, Jolivet attacks the Sartrean concept of a subjectivity which cannot be transcended. For weapon, he employs the Hegelian dictum, "It is solely by love that one is united with an object."

Sincerity, finally, can be a mode of existence—and more, a function of the idea of the values we would choose to pursue and realize. It is of the very meaning and sense of life. As a result, there exists a very real dialectic of sincerity whereby sincerity with one's self becomes the condition *sine qua non* for sincerity with others; whereby duplicity becomes either the result of deliberate hypocrisy or the natural conclusion of an ignorance of the profounder significance of life. Sincerity is the actuality of a value within one. This value (or better, these values) implies an *other*. My personal existence can never be isolated. It is constantly bound to the world in which I am working out my destiny. Apart from the world, it is but an empty form and nothing else.

Value is diffusive and polemic. Consequently, in the dialectic of value my ego must constantly keep a norm and a principle of evaluation for the establishment of the necessary hierarchy. In the end, the dialectic becomes an intensely spiritual thing, almost an asceticism which essentially implies the conquest of self.

St. Thomas, La Rochefoucauld, Proust, Marcel, Sartre, Rivière, Rilke, Spinoza, all these and others too, are quoted with an aptness and a familiarity which makes reading Jolivet as pleasant as it is thoughtful.

VICTOR R. YANITELLI, S.J.

Fordham University

THE NATURE OF LAW. By Thomas E. Davitt, S.J. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1951. Pp. 274. \$4.00.

Father Davitt sets forth the views of six philosophers from Henry of Ghent to Suarez, all of whom hold to the thesis of the superiority of the will over the intellect. This is followed by a presentation of the views of six other philosophers from Albert the Great to Bellarmine, who hold to the opposite thesis of the superiority of the intellect over the will. The views of each philosopher are ably and clearly presented. There follows a brief section of "Consequences," in which Father Davitt considers the practical consequences of the two divergent

views with regard to penal law and its binding nature in conscience. He comes to the interesting conclusion that modern Thomists in their views of the nature of a penal law and its practical effects actually follow the Suarezians, who hold to the superiority of the will over the intellect. He pleads for a thorough study of St. Thomas's concept of law and obligation and hopes that as a result there will be forthcoming a work equal in scope and influence to the *De legibus* of Suarez. One can but fervently endorse his plea and his hope. In addition, while much is being done there is still much that can be done to expand the work of St. Thomas in the whole field of political theory along the lines set forth by Professor Rommen and Dr. Messner.

JEROME G. KERWIN

University of Chicago

SUPER EVANGELIUM S. MATTHAEI LECTURA. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Edited by Raphael Cai, O.P. Turin: Marietti, 1951. Pp. ix + 429.

It is commonly granted that this work is a *reportatio*, notes taken in class by a somewhat unskilled student. It is also granted that this is most likely St. Thomas's first commentary on Sacred Scripture, and is dated between 1256 and 1259. For these reasons the work has not been studied much, and it may be many years before a critical text is issued.

This new text rests largely on the tradition of the previous editions; but it has been prepared carefully and in a few places has been compared with two manuscripts. The editor has given this edition a continuous numbering of paragraphs, like other recent Marietti editions. The edition should facilitate the study of this work. There are the usual indices of authors, subjects, Sunday Gospels, and an elaborate synoptic table.

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.

Saint Louis University

BIBLIOGRAFIA FILOSOFICA ITALIANA: ANNO 1949. Edited by U. A. Padovani and M. F. Sciacca. Milan: Dott. Carlo Marzorati, 1951. Pp. xi + 151.

Once more, we are indebted to the Center of Christian Philosophical Studies at Gallarate, Italy, for sponsoring a useful instrument of research. With the aid of U. A. Padovani, an annual bibliography of Italian philosophical literature has been launched by the indefatigable M. F. Sciacca. The first issue, covering the year 1949, contains three

parts. The first section is a bibliography of books, translations (into Italian), articles, and reviews arranged alphabetically according to author. More illuminating for the foreign reader who wishes to obtain a rapid general view of philosophical work presently being done in Italy is the second part, which orders the items according to subject matter. The main divisions employed are review-articles and bibliographies, philosophical congresses, editions of texts, history of philosophy, and systematic philosophy. As Sciacca remarks in his brief introduction, there is almost a complete neglect of Oriental philosophy and symbolic logic in Italy today; but this is compensated for by a growing interest in medieval philosophy, metaphysical problems concerning God, and historical studies in Vico and Marx. The third section provides an index of authors whose books are reviewed in Italian periodicals. We may hope that this worthwhile bibliographical project will be continued by the editors and strengthened by the support of those who appreciate Italian philosophical studies.

JAMES COLLINS

Saint Louis University

LA SITUATION SPIRITUELLE DE NOTRE EPOQUE. By Karl Jaspers. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1951. Pp. 248.

Here is an excellent translation of Jaspers's *Die geistige Situation der Zeit* (1931), the book which best explains the starting point of his existentialism.

Evoquer un monde entièrement dépourvu de foi, se représenter, au sein de ce monde, des hommes-machines qui se sont perdus eux-mêmes et ont perdu leur divinité, se représenter un noblesse dispersée qui sera bientôt complètement ruinée, cela n'est possible que de façon formelle et pour un bref instant. Il répugne à la dignité intérieure de l'homme—dignité qui est au delà de toute justification—de penser que la liberté, la foi, l'être-soi pourraient un jour disparaître pour se trouver remplacés par un appareil technique qui leur serait équivalent: il répugne tout autant à l'homme de penser à sa mort comme si elle était la négation totale de son existence. L'homme est plus que ce qu'il peut se représenter dans de telles perspectives.

There is a crying need for a philosophy of human existence simply because the whole tendency, tempo, and climate of our age moves towards a depersonalization and devaluation of the human individual. Philosophy for Jaspers begins not with the problem of being but with the exploration of man's *situation* in the world.

Man lives, develops, and strives for the perfection of his faculties

within the circumscribed limits of a concrete historical situation. It is this historical situation that Jaspers analyzes in *La situation spirituelle*. He finds therein a technical order reminiscent of Virgil Gheorghiu's *The Twenty-fifth Hour*. Civilization, culture, the sciences, by their fierce concentration on man as an exclusively empiric being—for all their quantitative conquests—have only brought the more sharply into focus man's standing in a spiritual vacuum, without faith, without a transcendent quality which gives meaning to his existence. The integrated personality becomes an impossibility from the very start because the naturalists and the scientists and the cultural anthropologists are all striving to make their discipline the only key to understanding man. It is thus that man is reduced by them to a libido, a highly-gearred animal, a cultural unit, a social statistic. Hence the tendency to solve all problems by mechanical means. Hence the terrible consequence wherein the very attempt to cure man's sickness on the empiric level leads only to the progressive aggravation of the malady and exacerbates his fever all the more.

Jaspers's critique of scientism, naturalism, and idealism has evolved an acute interpretation of the spiritual sterility of our times. His plea for a philosophy of existence, his respect for the notion of transcendence and its necessity in human existence, his bold demand for spiritual values in the affairs of men, all bear witness to the trenchant character of *La situation*. It is a pity that his transcendence is left hanging half way between atheism and revealed religion.

VICTOR R. YANITELLI, S.J.

Fordham University

POSITIVISM: A STUDY IN HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. By Richard von Mises. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. xi + 404. \$6.00.

This book of Von Mises' is an expository introduction to a modified positivism which is to be recommended to Scholastic philosophers desirous of learning the fundamentals of this system of philosophy. It has two qualities above all to recommend it, clear expression and orderly thought. Its clear expression is especially praiseworthy inasmuch as it forces its author to put his system before the reading public with all its merits and defects clearly exposed.

Von Mises' *Positivism* is essentially a translation of his *Kleines Lehrbuch des Positivismus* which was published in 1939. It consists of an Introduction, seven parts, twenty-seven pages of notes, and an Index. Each part is divided into four chapters, and each chapter is

divided into seven sections. At the end of each section there is a clear and concise summary of it; and in the last section of the last chapter, there is a summary of each part of the book.

The Introduction gives a general definition of positivism, an explanation of its methods, and a brief outline of the rest of the book. The seven succeeding parts treat of language, the analysis of language, the exact sciences, causality and probability, the humanities, metaphysics and art, ethics and religion. In the rest of this review we shall try to give a faithful summary of the basic ideas of the book and a criticism of them.

Positivism is the unified and consistent picture of observable experience. The basic thesis of positivism is the distinction between theory and observable experience. The area of pure theory in general says nothing about reality or experience, but consists of tautologies which are mere transformations from one form to another. Experience is the presently apprehended. The systematized area of tautologies for all knowledge is known as "logistic" or "general axiomatics" or "theoretical logic." The division of knowledge into these two areas involves two critical problems in the philosophy of positivism—first, the problem of deciding what a theory or tautology is; and, second, what the relation is between tautologies and observable experience.

The method which positivism uses to resolve these two problems is the scientific criticism of language; that is, it tries to determine what the original relations are between the elements of language and the experiences co-ordinated with them. This method is self-improving in that less critical language is used to produce more critical language.

This positivistic critique of language is based on the assumption that words, sentences, and sequences of sentences correspond to areas of experience. These areas of experience in general contain a core of meaning which practically everybody understands in the same way and an area of indeterminate meaning which different people use in quite different ways. Positivism tries to use words within this core area of unambiguous meaning. However, this use of words within their core area of meaning is always open to modification by more experience, and hence the positivistic critique of language is always changing.

The above assumption can be put more generally by saying that the intellect alone should be used to come to a knowledge of all things. It is not positively stated that the intellect is capable of coming to a

knowledge of all things, but that if the intellect cannot come to a knowledge of all things then no other faculty is at the disposal of man to do so. Hence positivism opposes all forms of negativism; that is, all those forms of philosophy in which man's knowledge is obtained through some other means than the use of the intellect on observable experience.

At this point positivism begins the analysis of language and this analysis is the heart of positivism. When confronted with the infinite, possible combinations of written symbols, positivism wants to decide which are capable of being true or false; that is, which have meaning. To this end Von Mises makes use of the criterion of connectibility. A group of words, sentences, or sequence of sentences is connectible if they are compatible with a system of statements which, it is assumed, are given and which determine the nature of all other statements—that is, which regulate the use of language. Strictly speaking, therefore, one would always have to say “connectible with . . .” and this addition can only be omitted when the system of reference is well known and taken for granted. Von Mises stresses the fact that connectibility involves compatibility between elements of language and not between elements of language and experience. “Let it be explicitly stated here once more that our term ‘connectibility’ points only to compatibility with (logical) rules of *language* and by no means to a possible incompatibility of two factual theories” (p. 74). It is at this point that Von Mises differs from the positivism of Schlick and Ayer, who think that the criterion of meaning is verifiability; that is, that a theory is judged to have meaning if it is applicable to experience. Against this position Von Mises says:

It does not appear expedient to accept verifiability (or perhaps in the unilateral sense, falsifiability) as the sole criterion of a sentence's admissibility, because the question of verification depends upon the accepted definitions, and hence upon the linguistic rules; thus, in the last analysis, verifiability is determined by the fact that the sentence in question can be embedded in a totality of sentences which for it take the place of linguistic rules (p. 76).

The ultimate problem is now posed of determining the fundamental area of meaning with which all other statements must be connectible in order to have meaning. To this end Von Mises uses Mach's doctrine of elements or primitive sensations. This doctrine says that the starting point of all knowledge is certain irreducible sensations out of which all succeeding knowledge is built, such as that I see blue, that I feel cold. These irreducible sensations are called protocol sentences, which

are generally found in the language of ordinary everyday life and in the exact positive sciences. The assertion that all statements can be reduced to elementary protocol sentences is a postulate whose validity is to be judged by the success it enjoys in describing experience.

These protocol sentences have meaning insofar as they have a fairly unmistakable relation to experience. Thus Von Mises says:

In attempting to arrive at unmisunderstandable basic sentences that can serve as starting points for a connectible system of knowledge, one finds as basic elements, which for the time being cannot be further reduced, certain denotations of direct sensations, of the form: I see blue, I feel cold, etc. (p. 81).

This relation between the protocol sentences and experience is only one of approximation, for as Von Mises says, "The element sentence contains only a *hint*, and its understandability rests upon a very rough agreement in the use of a restricted number of fundamental words" (p. 94). At this point meaning seems to be identified with verifiability.

Schlick prefers to speak, instead of protocol sentences, of "statements of fact," e.g., "here yellow meets blue now," "here now pain," etc. In such sentences, says Schlick, the act of comprehending (the words) coincides with that of verification; they sound convincing much as tautologies do. This is approximately what we expressed by saying that there exists satisfactory agreement about the correspondence of sounds (words) to certain experiences in very simple cases, to wit, the cases of element sentences (p. 95).

The rest of the book is an application of these principles to the various fields of knowledge. These applications are of extreme interest inasmuch as they give numerous instances in which to judge of the merits of positivism, but lack of space prohibits their expression here.

The author points out (p. v) that this book is not a philosophical appraisal of positivism, but rather a clear and adequate presentation of its doctrine, intended for the average educated man rather than the critical scholar. This restricted purpose of the book should be kept in mind when reading the criticism which follows because, although it is incumbent on us to point out what we think are basic difficulties in the positivistic position, these difficulties could perhaps be answered or at least partially mitigated in a more detailed defense of the system.

In our opinion Von Mises' system of logical positivism is contradictory because nowhere does it contain any exact knowledge of reality or experience. He maintains that all theoretical or tautological knowledge which we now have is merely an approximation to experience. Approximation in the present context means that our knowledge is

more or less like the object which is known. But how can we possibly know whether our knowledge is more or less like the object which is known? We cannot have recourse to another type of knowledge because that would pose the entire problem over again. We cannot appeal to successful usage, as Von Mises occasionally does, because how could we know whether one usage was more successful than another? In other words, according to Von Mises we know that something is an approximation without knowing anything at all about that to which it is an approximation. We submit that such a position is a contradiction.

This contradiction is verified in various parts of Von Mises' system. Tautologies are said to be meaningful if they are connectible with a basic area of meaning. Yet the concept of connectibility itself is only approximately exact. Again, the basic, protocol sentences are only approximately like experience. How do we know that connectibility and the basic protocol sentences are only approximately exact?

It may be objected that such a criticism of Von Mises' positivism is to oversimplify his doctrine and thus distort it. What is meant, it might be said, by approximation to experience is best exemplified by an example. Suppose that we know that the length of a certain ruler is one meter with a possible error of one ten-thousandth of a meter. In other words we know that the length of a certain ruler lies between .9999 meters and 1.0001 meters. Similarly we know the meaning of connectibility and the basic protocol sentences within certain specific limits.

This objection is not valid because it surreptitiously introduces some exact knowledge of which we are not explicitly aware. In the example given we must know that there are such things as definite lengths. If a length of its very nature did not have a definite magnitude, would it make any more sense to say that the meter stick's length was between .9999 and 1.0001 meters than to say that it was exactly 1 meter long? In other words, we have at least this much exact knowledge about the meter stick, that, whatever its length, it is determined and not just any length. If every lens threw a picture out of focus, and if our only way of seeing were through a lens, how could we ever know that there was such a thing as a clear picture?

The reason why a positivist can work in the shadow of such a contradiction seems to be that when he applies his general theory to practice he surreptitiously uses some exact standard. For instance, Von Mises admits the greater validity of modern over medieval science. In other words, he has some criterion which tells him that modern science is a closer approximation to the truth than medieval science.

This criticism of logical positivism is not peculiar to the Scholastic school of philosophy. A very similar criticism, but from the standpoint of certitude, has been given by C. I. Lewis in the *Philosophical Review* for April, 1952, where he directed his criticism against Hans Reichenbach, who in this particular point is at one with Von Mises. Again, a similar criticism, but this time from the standpoint of necessity, has been published by Brand Blanshard in his book *The Nature of Thought* (I, 412) against the positivism of A. J. Ayer.

This criticism does not pretend to be exhaustive, but we do think that it is fundamental. The reader who wishes to get quickly at the heart of Von Mises' system and to prove or disprove the above criticism should read Parts II and III of this book.

JOSEPH F. WULFTANGE, S.J.

West Baden College

TRAITÉ DU LIBRE ARBITRE. By Yves Simon. Liège: Sciences et Lettres, 1951. Pp. 140. Paper, 100 fr.

Professor Simon is already well known for two previous books on related subjects, *Introduction à l'ontologie du connaître* and *Critique de la connaissance morale*. His new monograph on free will is of equal, if not greater, importance.

The scope of the work can most easily be shown from a list of the chapter topics. They are: images of disorder (as symbols of freedom), the passions of man, the intelligible, a privileged case of natural necessity (the necessity of the will to embrace the good), consciousness of liberty, free will or free judgment, free will and the principle of causality, the divine perfections (in what sense freedom is a pure perfection able to be found in God), the idea of indetermination, and law and liberty.

Only at one point can serious exception be taken. Professor Simon wants to hold that the ordinary man knows that he is free, and that such an untrained man actually uses the essential steps of a philosophical proof of freedom. This position is incardinated into an explanation of "the philosophy of common sense" (pp. 59-69), in which the author follows Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange's explanation. The difference between the philosophy of common sense and the philosophy of the schools is said to be merely this, that the former is expressed in images and symbols (and so cannot defend itself against error) while the latter has at its disposal the techniques of analysis and systematization. The "purified common sense" notion of Thomism is open to grave epistemological objections (for it can be accused either of being

dogmatic if it does not examine the suppositions of common sense or of engaging in an infinite regress of justification); it results either in a depreciation of philosophy (who wants to spend years studying what everybody already knows, including the most ignorant?) or in a Rousseauvian exaltation of the native powers of the untrained mind; and it seems to be based on a division of knowledge by material object rather than by formal object.

But apart from this one passage, there are many excellent things in this book. Some ought to be singled out for special notice. Professor Simon points out that our direct experience is sensory-intellectual in character; it is not an experience of sensation going on at the same time as intellection. Concretely, he shows that there is no such thing as a "sensation" or an "imagination"; all our conscious activity is penetrated with intellect (pp. 17-19). So, too, our affective-emotional life is penetrated with will; even in what is held to be the most animal-like slavery to passion the "infinity" of the rational appetite can be found (pp. 13-17); the experiences referred to by the term "sublimation" are understood when we see that the sensory level can be an instrument of the rational (pp. 23-26). Hence, the fact of freedom as we experience it is not enough, and simple consciousness can never yield more than the fact; any philosophical statement must give some understanding and explanation of the fact.

In his discussion of the natural necessity of the human will, the author integrates this point into the whole doctrine of finality and appetite. In particular, the author points out that in all activity two functions must be distinguished: formal predetermination in virtue of which an action is such rather than of some other kind, and "existential predetermination" in virtue of which an action occurs (rather than being merely possible) (pp. 38-42).

A third point which deserves attention is the relation between choice and causality. The author clearly and successfully makes his point that there is no opposition between these two notions. Rather, causality is to be found, in a sense in an even more perfect form, in the very freedom of choice. One of the insights which enables this point to be made so well is that the last practical judgment is a formal cause (this means, an *intrinsic* formal cause) of the act of choice itself (pp. 100-105).

There is an index of proper names, but unfortunately no index of subjects.

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.

Saint Louis University

WAY TO WISDOM. By Karl Jaspers. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 208. \$3.00.

This volume contains Ralph Manheim's translation of Jaspers's radio talks given in 1949 and published in 1950 under the title *Einführung in die Philosophie*. As an "introduction" it recapitulates the principal themes of Jaspers's thinking: the well-known *Grenzsituation*, ("limiting situation," or, as Manheim translates it, "ultimate situation"); the relationship of *Existenz* (super-empirical existence as distinguished from *Dasein*, exclusively empirical existence) to transcendence, that is, to God; and the distinction between philosophical and religious faith.

Underlying *Way to Wisdom* lies a deadly individualism which tends to isolate the existential thinker to such an extent that no communication between *Existenz* and transcendence is possible. And yet, communication is purported to be the beginning and the end of philosophy. "The basic philosophical attitude of which I am speaking is rooted in distress at the absence of communication, in the drive to authentic communication, and in the possibility of the loving contest which profoundly unites self and self."

Despite this emphasis on communication as rooted in the basic philosophical experiences of wonder, doubt, and the consciousness of ultimate situations, the book does make it clear that Jaspers's "God" is neither the transcendent God of theism nor the immanent, pantheistic God of Spinoza. In fact, Jaspers seems here to use the terms "transcendence" and "God" synonymously—far more than in the longer and more elaborate *Existenzphilosophie*. However, *Way to Wisdom* suffers from its own efforts at synthesis. One of Jaspers's fundamental notions, the one he employs most frequently to clarify his own meaning of "transcendence," is the concept of "das Umgreifende" (translated as "the Comprehensive"). *Way to Wisdom* is sure to be confusing on this point to the reader who is not familiar with the connotations in the term. It does not quite make clear that "the Comprehensive" is an unknowable, a framework "enveloping" all that we know. There is a "Comprehensive" for the world, for one's own self, and, finally, one which is "transcendence" (God) in the strict sense.

Consequently, one can see why Jaspers rejects both the atheistic position and that of "revealed religion." The former makes "false claims of rationalistic pseudo-knowledge" while the latter assumes "a falsely rational form." Philosophical "faith," then, has definite meaning. "The principles of philosophical faith become false when

they are taken as communication of a content. For none of these principles implies an absolute object; they are to be taken as the symbol of an infinity becoming concrete. Where this infinity is present in faith, the endless reality of the world takes on meaning as its manifestation. But this meaning must still be interpreted."

VICTOR R. YANITELLI, S.J.

Fordham University

THE EXISTENTIALISTS: A CRITICAL STUDY. By James Collins. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952. Pp. 268.

The existentialists are Sartre, Jaspers, Marcel, and Heidegger. Their immediate intellectual background is Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Husserl. They are judged under five "existential themes": the venture of philosophizing, descriptive metaphysics, man in the world, man and fellow man, man and God. Mr. Collins has preferred to approach existentialism through separate studies of these existentialists to avoid "arbitrary abstractions" or "a wholly one-sided definition." This is the merit as well as the weakness of the presentation.

Probably Mr. Collins does right not to mention other contemporary philosophers who are associated with the existentialists—Unamuno and Ortega, Berdyaev and Shestov, Buber and Picard; for it would be even harder to avoid discussing what they have in common when one adds to their number. But Jaspers, Marcel, Heidegger, and Sartre—to put them in their chronological order—are still the chief figures in existentialism; and they themselves recognize the fact. But it is time more of us were uneasy about this monopoly of original thinking. Will existentialism stop when these four existentialists stop? Surely one cannot pretend that books like Mr. Collins's and my own extend the discussion beyond Marcel or Heidegger. So far there is no published third generation—counting Kierkegaard (and Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche?) as the first.

Of the studies now in English, Mr. Collins's is the first to discuss Marcel fully, the first to use the later writings of Heidegger. It is for this reason the first complete study of the second generation of existentialists. It is also the first critical study of the philosophical themes found in existentialism that academic philosophers in America would, or should, find most interesting. And the study is notable for its thorough scholarship, its scrupulous fairness, and a most welcome unobtrusive sympathy. The section on Heidegger is the best I have read anywhere, and, unlike other parts of the book, begins to move one as existentialism is meant to. The section on Marcel is good, too.

But why does Heidegger move us more than Marcel? Marcel is the only figure in the book who escapes a drubbing, and yet Mr. Collins sees "the possibility of greater advances in Heidegger." What are these? The answer, implied rather than made explicit, can help us understand the kind of book this is. Heidegger is more moving than Marcel because Heidegger is waiting for God, and Marcel and some of the rest of us are not. We may sense in him, as a figure, the loneliness of man's need for divine charity, a loneliness so complete it dares not long for God. In his remove of waiting from longing, one should sense the enormity of the remove of modern man from open faith itself. This is why Heidegger moves, but not why he seems to promise more than the believer Marcel. Heidegger is a systematic philosopher, a metaphysician, even though he has now reversed Marcel's progress, by proceeding from treatise to poetic interpretation, while Marcel has proceeded from journal to Gifford Lectures. In Heidegger philosophical anthropology is subordinated to the quest for metaphysics. For all Marcel's interest in metaphysics, he has never ceased examining particular sentiments and aspects of man's dealings with other men and the world around man. Marcel has not been looking for Being, having found God. Heidegger having found neither—and unwilling to suppose anyone else has either—is waiting for Being to announce its presence again, so that he himself can finally announce how Being differs from the reality that he knows in man and the world (that other philosophers think they know of the whole and the source of the whole). There is no clearer discussion of this seeking and waiting of Heidegger than Mr. Collins's, especially his neat explanation of *Da-sein*, as man the index of being. For if Being is anywhere to be opened up to us, it will be, Heidegger holds, in the consciousness of the being who but for this consciousness would be only a being-unto-death. If Heidegger had read St. Thomas and some Thomists more carefully, if only he and Marcel knew the doctrine of analogy, he might then hold a "liberalized Thomism."

And so he might. But it is hard for me to believe that Heidegger would any longer be Heidegger, that the gain would be worth his loss. Throughout his book Mr. Collins's observations are expert and just. He seizes Sartre and Jaspers by the throat and strangles them—justly. From the standpoint of "a philosophical theism and realism," crypto-Thomism, their epistemology and their metaphysics are wanting. And so I too think they are. But existentialism is not a matter mainly of epistemology and metaphysics; and it is misleading to discuss these four figures as existentialists unless one makes more of an effort to

discuss the sense in which (a) they have some attitude in common and (b) this differs from the so-called existentialism of Thomism. What are "existential insights"? They are not Mr. Collins's "five existential themes," for these are existential only as any theme an existentialist talks about can be called existential. Mr. Collins has made it possible for other philosophers to see that existentialists, too, are philosophers; but he has not made clear in what essential way existentialists are not like other philosophers. He has preferred to deal rather with "methods and problems than a common fund of doctrine," and the problems are the problems of every philosophy. It is true and lucky that existentialists do not have a common fund of doctrine. But if their problems are simply the problems discussed by naturalists as well as by Thomists, their claim to distinction is considerably less than some have supposed. Is this why Mr. Collins deals so scantily with Kierkegaard, as "background"? Kierkegaard cannot be discussed as an epistemologist or a metaphysician. His category was "the individual"; his contribution to this was "inwardness," which Mr. Collins does not even mention. Nor does he bring out the positive attraction of Sartre's perverse judgment that to receive is to be enslaved. Likewise, he runs swiftly over Jaspers's boundary-situations, the main contribution of Jaspers to existentialism; and he does not mention Marcel's chief category, presence. And he discusses Heidegger only in terms of the metaphysical search and not at all in terms of the philosophical anthropology, the hypnotic analysis of care (*Sorge*), which at one level certainly defines this search.

Of the three figures in the background it is Husserl rather than Kierkegaard or Nietzsche whose influence would seem to predominate, and so it would if one were examining existentialists chiefly for their epistemology and metaphysics. I, too, would say that Husserl's influence has limited the development of a realistic epistemology and metaphysics and even distracted Sartre and Heidegger from their central themes. But one can understand existential insights without understanding Husserl or realistic epistemology and metaphysics. This shocking, perhaps naïve, statement is the kind of thing that has kept the academic philosophers at arm's length from existentialism. And here I can agree with Maritain; they should be kept at arm's length if the central inspiration is to live on beyond this second generation. If the critics cannot see the anguish in the philosophy as well as in the philosophers, existentialism is already dead.

A philosophy dies when it continues to be misconceived or when it is discussed only insofar as it approaches or fails to approach some other

philosophy. Already Mr. Collins is saying that "one cannot reasonably be expected to devote a lifetime to the study of this philosophy." His own reading is extensive enough to amount to such a devotion; and it is too bad that he should wish to placate hostile philosophers and not maintain boldly that the aim of existentialism is as noble as theirs and just as worth a lifetime's devotion as theirs or his. Although his own Thomist background turns his attention away from those aspects of existentialism which are specifically existential (in some non-Thomist sense), surely it is the very religious aspiration within existentialism that his own religious and Thomist conscience has responded so vigorously to. For what is existentialism but an accounting of man's absence from, longing for, and touching on Being? Heidegger's definition, "l'engagement par l'Etre pour l'Etre," is paraphrased sympathetically by Mr. Collins as follows: "the inherent dynamism of existentialism prompts the individual to seek outside himself, to become ec-static in the non-mystical sense of being mindful of the other."

It is unfortunate that he should displace this balance by saying that "the center of gravity is being rather than man." The existentialist claim is that it is neither the one nor the other. That is how far one misses the point in asking why existentialists insist on "beginning metaphysical inquiry with an analysis of the questioning self and its situation." The answer is that they are not interested primarily in metaphysics—not even Heidegger, the seeker after metaphysics. That is why they seem to say that God and things do not exist, only men. Of course, they know that God and things may exist; but only man is *Da-sein*, and they themselves are men. Things may tend towards God; only man longs for God. If I may say so, this is the failing of most Thomists, a forgetting of their own relation to what is. Why should existentialism "justify its implied humanistic and moralistic interpretation of the act of existing"? It is human existing that the existentialist is concerned about, and, because of this, in the source and end of human existence. If this, too, seems to shift the center of gravity, one is entitled to ask, "From whose point of view?" We are not dispassionate spectators, however we should like to be; consequently, it should not be difficult to understand why Marcel is wary of the proofs of God's existence. Is it not at least possible that proofs may look quite different to someone with a different emotional experience? What is the emotional experience of a Thomist? And does not one have to assume that the kind of reasoning one employs in finding implications in existents is valid no matter what kind of existents

one is talking about and what kind of questions one asks? To emphasize philosophy as a science is to miss the deeper role of philosophy as a contemplative experience, as my friend Father Vincent Turner has put it—philosophy as “interiorised scholasticism,” as the shamefully neglected Rousselot saw it.

If these remarks seem unduly critical of a first-rate book, let me end by advertising some of Mr. Collins's most perceptive expositions—his discussions of Sartre's distinctions between consciousness and substance, ontology and metaphysics, and Sartre's In-itself; the brilliant characterization of Jaspers's philosophy as “an attempt to chart the course of Kantian reason in the enveloping sea of Kierkegaardian existence”; the discussion of Jaspers's distinction between philosophical contemplation and prayer, his subordination of religion to philosophy; the useful observation that Marcel is the only one of the four to escape Kantian agnosticism; the understanding of the importance of recollection in Marcel (one might wish that someone would spell out the interconnections between recollection and reflection with spiritual nostalgia and psychological and moral recognition); and finally his moving account of Heidegger on homelessness.

RALPH HARPER

Harvard University

TRANSLATIONS FROM THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF GOTTLIEB FREGE. Edited by Peter Geach and Max Black. Oxford: Blackwell; New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. Pp. x + 244. \$5.75.

The publication of these excerpts in translation from the logical and mathematical works of Frege is a genuine service to all who are engaged in a study of mathematical logic or of the theories of the foundations of mathematics.

Frege was the chief philosophical progenitor of the notions of Whitehead and Russell—notions which found their definitive expression in *Principia Mathematica*, a work that is classic in the formulation of the logistic theory of the foundations of mathematics. Frege's importance, however, is not constituted solely by the distinction of his successors, for his writings are eminently valuable in their own right.

Up to the present the greater part of Frege's work has been unavailable to the general scholar; and just two years ago a beginning was made in the attempt to remedy that situation by the publication of his *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* in the translation of J. L. Austin. Some sections, it is true, of Frege's *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* did

appear, again in translation, in the *Monist* for 1915-17, but these particular issues of the periodical are not generally available. And as the original German editions of his books and the journals in which his articles first appeared are also unobtainable, the publication of this collection in translation of writings ranging from 1879 to 1919 is of particular importance. The prefixed glossary is a distinct help; the omission of an index is regrettable.

The portion of *Begriffsschrift* with which this book opens gives the reader a valuable introduction to the logical symbolism employed by Frege for the analysis of statements. This symbolism, by the way, though put aside for that of Peano in *Principia Mathematica* because of the latter's greater convenience, was nonetheless acknowledged by Russell to represent a philosophical insight far more profound than that behind Peano's analysis. The tide of mathematical or symbolic logic has flowed a long way since the appearance of *Begriffsschrift* in 1879, and some of Frege's analysis has unfortunately been left behind in the onrush. His conviction, for example, that the generalization or universal quantification of the conditional was dependent upon a causal connection between the elements of the conditional is a point that merits the serious consideration of Scholastic philosophers now bedeviled by positivistic logicians—a conviction which is conspicuously absent in such men as Quine and Tarski.

Of more immediate interest to the philosophers of mathematics is the selection from the *Grundgesetze* in which Frege attacks the early formalist theories of Heine and Thomae. His analysis here of "sign" and "reference"—or, as we should say, of "symbol" and "object represented"—is an excellent example of a type of critique in which the Thomist would find himself quite at home. Likewise of interest, as the editors observe, is the appendix to Vol. II of *Grundgesetze* treating of Russell's paradox and thereby removing a somewhat common historical misunderstanding.

The editors have done a very commendable job in presenting the much-needed material for the study of Frege's logical and mathematical contributions. Perhaps the reception which this book deserves will stimulate them to doing a similar service to L. E. J. Brouwer, another eminent philosopher of mathematics whose work too is all but unobtainable.

JAMES S. ALBERTSON, S.J.

Saint Louis University

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.
2. Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.
3. Books received by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.

APOSTLE, HIPPOCRATES GEORGE. *Aristotle's Philosophy of Mathematics*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. x + 228. \$6.00.

This is a timely book in view of the present great interest in the philosophy of mathematics. The author makes the keen observation that some modern mathematical philosophers who refer to early works on the subject "were more anxious to dismiss than to discover them" (p. vii).

The exposition is largely deductive, following the "order of nature." The first chapter deals with mathematics in general; the second, with arithmetic; the third, with geometry; the fourth, with composite sciences; the fifth, with Aristotle's criticism of various philosophical views.

The text is carefully annotated. There is a valuable dictionary of Aristotelian terms which enables the reader to know what Greek term is being used. There is an index.

ARISTOTLE. *Metaphysics*. Tr. by Richard Hope. With an analytical index of technical terms. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 408. \$5.00.

BAUMGART, DAVID. *Bentham and the Ethics of Today*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; Nov., 1952. \$7.50.

BENTHAM, JEREMY. *Handbook of Political Fallacies*. Ed. by Harold A. Larrabee. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1952. Pp. 304. \$4.75.

BERTALANFFY, LUDWIG VON. *Problems of Life*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1952. Pp. 216. \$4.00.

BOEHNER, PHILOTHEUS. *Medieval Logic*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 147. \$3.00.

BRENNAN, ROBERT EDWARD, O.P. *General Psychology*. Rev. ed. New York: Macmillan Co., 1952. Pp. xxxii + 524. \$5.50.

This textbook, combining scientific and philosophical psychology,

has become one of the classic Thomistic textbooks since its publication in 1937. The basic structure remains the same. It is divided into three books: vegetative life, sensitive life, and intellectual life. Each of these books is divided into two parts, the first, scientific and the second, philosophical.

The revision is extensive, going almost to the point of a complete rewriting. In many places, the revision follows the first edition sentence for sentence; in most places, the thought is kept unchanged; in both cases, the revisions aim at clarity and simplicity of expression. In the scientific sections, the detail of the first edition has been somewhat reduced in favor of a fuller explanation of a few simpler examples. Readings and references have been brought up to date.

- BROAD, CHARLES DUNBAR. *Ethics and the History of Philosophy*. New York: Humanities Press, 1952. Pp. 287. \$4.50.
- BUBER, MARTIN. *Eclipse of God*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1952. Pp. 192. \$2.50.
- BURY, J. B. *A History of Freedom of Thought*. Epilogue by H. J. Blackham. 2d ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 253. \$2.00.
- CHALMERS, GORDON KEITH. *The Republic and the Person*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952. \$4.00.
- CONANT, JAMES B. *Modern Science and Modern Man*. "Bampton Lectures in America," No. 5. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Nov., 1952. Pp. 112. \$2.00.
- CORNFORD, F. M. *Principium Sapientiae: The Origins of Greek Philosophical Thought*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1952. \$6.00.
- DAVIDSON, ROBERT F. *Philosophies Men Live By*. New York: Dial Press, 1952. \$5.00.
- DEWEY, JOHN, and OTHERS. *The Cleavage in our Culture*. Ed. by Frederick Burkhardt. Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. \$3.00.
- DICKEY, C. R. *Emerging Civilization: Evaluation of Philosophy*. Dallas: Story Book Press, 1952. \$3.00.
- DOUGLAS, PAUL. *Ethics in Government*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Oct., 1952. \$2.25.
- DUNCAN-JONES, AUSTIN. *Butler's Moral Philosophy*. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1952. Pp. 192. Paper, 65¢

After a brief chapter on Bishop Butler's life and writings, the author examines Butler's theory of human nature and conscience. Then he takes up the distinction between selfishness and egoism; after this, he discusses the content of morality, the question of "desert" (merit and demerit), and the place of God in Butler's ethics, and concludes with a consideration of some ultimate problems of ethics. Throughout the book, the author makes many comparisons with present-day theories and relates Butler's problems with problems of today; he is particularly concerned with the problem of the meaning of moral judgments. There is a brief index.

- DURANT, WILL. *Story of Philosophy*. New York: Pocket Books; Jan., 1953. 50¢
- EASTON, STEWART C. *Roger Bacon and His Search for a Universal Science*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Sept., 1952. Pp. 225. \$4.00.
- EMBRY, JOHN. *The Namic Philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Nov., 1952. \$3.00.
- EPPSTEIN, JOHN. *Code of International Ethics*. Westminster: Newman Press; Nov., 1952. \$4.00.
- ESSER, GERARD, S.V.D. *Metaphysica Generalis*. Rev. ed. Techny, Ill.: Mission Press, 1952. Pp. xvi + 368. \$4.00.

This is the second edition of a work originally brought out in 1933.

The extent of the revision can be seen in comparing the size of the two editions, the first consisting of 283 pages. Though the text is in Latin, the copious footnotes quote many contemporary writers, some in their own language, others in English translation. There is a very detailed table of contents, as well as indices of authors and subjects. There is also a rather full bibliography, and there are suggestions for further readings at the end of each chapter.

The author's aim is to provide a book which is at once orientated toward modern problems and a synthesis of Scholastic opinions. The extent to which this synthesis is carried can be seen in the two following positions: "Ratio entis primario competit ei, quod existit, secundario ei, quod est gradus entis qui existere potest" (p. 26), and "Sufficit distinctio metaphysica inter essentiam et existentiam in ente contingente" (p. 114).

The book covers all the points which are ordinarily considered to belong to the treatise on metaphysics.

FAIRCHILD, HOXIE N., and OTHERS. *Religious Perspectives in College Teaching*. New York: Ronald Press, 1952. \$4.50.

FASNACHT, G. F. *Acton's Political Philosophy*. New York: Viking Press; Jan., 1953. \$4.00.

FRITZ, CHARLES ANDREW, JR. *Bertrand Russell's Construction of the External World*. New York: Humanities Press, 1952. Pp. 243. \$4.50.

GARNETT, A. CAMPBELL. *Moral Nature of Man: A Critical Evaluation of Ethical Principles*. New York: Ronald Press, 1952. \$3.75.

HAZELTON, ROGER. *On Proving God*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1952. Pp. 186. \$2.50.

HEGEL, GEORG W. F. *Philosophy of Hegel*. Ed. by Carl J. Friedrich. New York: Modern Lib., 1952. \$1.25.

HEISENBERG, WERNER. *Philosophic Problems of Nuclear Science*. Tr. from the German by F. C. Hayes. New York: Pantheon Books, 1952. Pp. 126. \$2.75.

HEMPEL, CARL G. *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. \$2.00.

HESSELBERG, ARTHUR KENNETH. *A Comparative Study of the Political Theories of Ludovicus Molina and John Milton*. Washington, Catholic Univ. of America Press. Pp. 25. 50¢

HOUGH, LYNN HAROLD. *Great Humanists*. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press; Oct., 1952. \$3.50.

HUSIK, ISAAC. *Philosophical Essays, Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern*. Ed. by Milton C. Nahm and Leo Strauss. New York: Macmillan Co., 1952. Pp. 399. \$6.75.

IVANOV, VYACHESLAV. *Freedom and the Tragic Life: A Study in Dostoevsky*. New York: Noonday Press, 1952. \$3.50.

JASPERS, KARL. *Existentialism and Humanism*. New York: Russell F. Moore Co.; Dec., 1952. \$3.50.

———. *Tragedy Is Not Enough*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. \$2.25.

JOHNSON, A. H. *Whitehead's Theory of Reality*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. \$4.00.

JONES, W. T. *A History of Western Philosophy*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1952. \$8.75.

KANT, IMMANUEL. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Ed. by Norman Kemp Smith. Reissue. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1952. \$5.00.

KENNY, JOHN P., O.P. *Principles of Medical Ethics*. Westminster: New-man Press; Nov., 1952. \$3.50.

KRAFT, VICTOR. *The Origins of Neo-Positivism*. Tr. by Arthur Pap. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Oct., 1952. \$3.75.

- LECLER, JOSEPH, S.J. *The Two Sovereignties*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. \$3.75.
- LINSKY, LEONARD (ed.). *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language*. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press. Pp. 298. \$3.75.
- MAIMONIDES. *The Guide of the Perplexed*. Abridged ed. Introd. and commentary by Julius Guttman. Tr. from the Arabic by Chaim Rabin. New York: Farrar, Straus & Young, 1952. Pp. 243. \$4.50.
- MARITAIN, JACQUES. *The Range of Reason*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1952.
- MASLOW, PAUL. *The Life Science*. Vol. II, *Powers of the Mind*. Brooklyn: author, 1952. Pp. 135-228. Paper, \$3.50.
- This book consists of chapters 51 to 100, inclusive, of a projected three-volume work called *The Life Science*. It is an essay in theoretical scientific psychology, with much of the theory-basis drawn from psychoanalysis. There is an elaborate bibliography of 545 items; the volume does not contain an index.
- MCCALL, RAYMOND J. *Basic Logic*. Rev. ed. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1952. Pp. xxvi + 235. \$3.00.
- This introductory text, first published in 1947, has been completely rewritten. Most of the revisions have been made for the sake of clarity and fullness of expression. The author mentions a few points in which larger changes have been made: a new system of classifying the indefinite and singular propositions; bringing the "circumstantially quantified" proposition under traditional principles; extended treatments of modal propositions and of eductive implication; regrouping of the rules of the categorical syllogism under three headings; extended treatment of chain arguments; the function of the term "only" and of oblique syllogisms. In addition to the many examples used in the text, there are twenty-nine pages of exercises (pp. 201-29).
- NEILL, THOMAS P. *Religion and Culture*. "The Gabriel Richard Lecture." Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1952. Pp. ix + 102. \$2.75.
- This thoughtful paper carefully analyzes modern culture, taking particular notice of the world-view expressed in contemporary American literature. In spite of the implied compliment to Christopher Dawson, the book is an original reworking of Dawson's thesis on the American scene and is particularly valuable for its detailed, scholarly notes (pp. 79-102).
- PALMER, HAROLD. *Psychiatric Prolegomena*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Oct., 1952. \$2.75.
- PASSMORE, J. A. *Hume's Intentions*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; Nov., 1952. \$3.75.
- PFUETZE, PAUL. *Martin Buber: Philosopher of the Personal*. "University of Georgia Monographs," No. 2. Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press; Nov., 1952. \$1.75.
- Philosophical Studies in Honor of the Very Reverend Ignatius Smith, O.P.* Ed. by Rt. Rev. Msgr. John K. Ryan. Westminster: Newman Press, 1952. Pp. x + 316. \$5.00.
- This is a collection of essays by friends, former students, and associates of the Very Reverend Ignatius Smith on the occasion of his sixty-fifth birthday. There are sixteen essays, ranging in content from the logic of science to ethics, including several in the history of philosophy.
- There is an index.

- ROMUALDEZ, SISTER BELLARMINE. *The Concept of Being in Modern Educational Theories*. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1952. Pp. 219. \$2.25.
- ROYCE, JOSIAH. *The Religious Philosophy of Josiah Royce*. Ed. by Stuart Gerry Brown. Syracuse: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 239. \$3.00.
- SIWEK, PAUL. *The Enigma of the Hereafter*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Oct., 1952. \$3.00.
- Socratic, The*. No. 5. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. Pp. 63. Paper, \$1.75.

This is a collection of papers which (with the exception of Austin Farrer's) were presented to the Oxford University Socratic Club. The subtitle, "Contemporary Philosophy and Christian Faith," indicates the general content of the issue. There is a foreword by John Wisdom. The first paper, by Basil Mitchell, points up the problem. Papers by I. M. Crombie, Geoffrey Midgley, and Austin Farrer deal directly with the topic. Papers by H. H. Price, C. S. Lewis, and Iris Murdoch are on more tangential points.

These papers are a valuable source for understanding the position of contemporary British thinkers (who are not Catholics) on the problem of the relation between reason and faith. The "contemporary philosophy" is of course philosophical analysis (logical empiricism). The "theologians" make some distinction between natural and revealed theology, but it does not seem to be clearly made and seems to be closely related to the distinction between knowing that God is and what He is. The "theologians'" major problem is that of analogy—its nature and its value.

- SPEIER, HANS. *Social Order and the Risks of War*. New York: George W. Stewart, 1952. Pp. 506. \$4.75.
- SPIEGEL, HENRY WILLIAM (ed.). *The Development of Economic Thought*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1952. Pp. 823. \$6.50.
- STEENBERGHEN, FERNAND, VAN. *Ontology*. Tr. by Martin J. Flynn. New York: J. F. Wagner; Oct., 1952. \$5.00.
- TOMLIN, E. W. F. *The Great Philosophers: The Eastern World*. New York: A. A. Wyn, 1952. \$3.50.
- TSANOFF, RADOSLAV A. *Great Philosophers*. New York: Harper & Bros.; Jan., 1953. \$3.75.
- VAN ACKEREN, GERALD F., S.J. *Sacra Doctrina. The Subject of the First Question of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Introd. by Yves M. J. Congar, O.P. Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1952. Pp. 135. Paper.

Though this dissertation is largely concerned with theological matters, some of the discussion is very pertinent to philosophers. The author's chief contribution consists in the determination of the meanings of St. Thomas's terms, *doctrina*, *disciplina*, and *scientia*. The author concludes that *doctrina* in its formal sense "is an action, the instruction of men in knowledge" (p. 119); *disciplina* is the passive correlate of *doctrina* in the student, and *scientia* is the habit of knowledge which results. Having made this interpretation on the basis of a careful analysis of texts, he then applies it to the first question.

There are an index and a bibliography.

- WHITE, EDWARD A. *Science and Religion in American Thought: The Impact of Naturalism*. Stanford Univ., Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1952. \$2.50; Paper, \$1.50.

- WISDOM, JOHN. *Other Minds*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Nov., 1952. \$4.75.
- WOODGER, JOSEPH HENRY. *Biology and Language*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 377. \$8.00.
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